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1 Introduction
Economic enquiry upon the health-sector often has a demand focus which has missed some of
the more interesting “supply-side” features of the industry. The “cost of” unhealthy consumer
behaviour; the inequalities of access to health care; the prevalence and incidence of disease, are
rich “demand-side” research areas. Supply-side economic enquiry: the health-sector’s structure,
its production processes, its cost-drivers, its capital and labour markets, and its adaptability to
change, have received less researcher attention. Part of the reason relates to the paucity of good
supply-side data: detailed reliable information on health-sector costs and inputs are not readily
available. While high demand-side research interest remains, the lack of supply-side economic
data diminishes the attractiveness of supply-side health-sector research for researchers.
The lack of health-sector supply-side economic research has resulted in some of the discipline’s
major insights being unapplied. The optimality of resource allocations, the quality of information
available for decision-making, the returns earnt by economic factors-of-production, and the
flexibility and adaptability of free-markets are well-known characteristics of competitive markets.
Uncompetitive markets misallocate resources across industries; misallocate resources within
an industry; entrench existing methods and techniques of manufacture; confer unwarranted
privilege, and prevent agents receiving an appropriate share of surpluses from production. While
competitive market restrictions may sometimes be justified,1 the societal welfare losses from
overly restrictive departures from competition behove the robust periodic review of restrictive
institutional arrangements or practices.
The health-sector’s output and labour markets are highly non-competitive. The New Zealand
Government dominates health-service purchasing and its service provision. The labour market is
highly non-competitive, partly by design through the Health Practitioner Competency Assurance
Act 2003 (HPCA), but also through how the HPCA Act has been implemented by Responsible
Authorities (RA) empowered by the Act. The majority of DHB workers are employed under
“Multi-employer Collective Agreements” (MECAs) that govern all aspects of their employment
relationship. MECAs are nationally negotiated agreements between individual District Health
Boards (DHBs), who negotiate collectively, and incorporated societies that act as unions,
dominated by four health-specific organisations.
1For example, where supplier failure could cause disproportional harm to consumers which cannot be insured
against or foreseen in advance, provider regulation may be required.
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Labour economists generally view unions as “rent-seeking institutions that use monopoly
power to transfer economic surplus from other economic agents to their members”.2 Economic
theory postulates unions decrease societal welfare, distort economic efficiency, and expropriate
economic surplus for their member’s pecuniary gain. Through their “monopoly face”, unions
increase wages, induce firms to employ fewer workers and more capital per worker, and hire
higher quality labour than is socially efficient.
How New Zealand’s health-sector labour markets interact with the DHB Provider Arms is
my thesis’ focus. Using health-service delivery data, workforce data, and DHB monthly financial
information, I estimate the DHB Provider Arm economic production process and the interaction
between DHBs and the health-sector labour and capital input markets.
Production and input market interactions are modelled through simultaneously estimating a
DHB production function together with the first order conditions for cost-minimisation in an
econometric system-of-equations. Estimating a system-of-equations allows labour and capital
market prices to interact with DHB marginal input productivities according to the first order
conditions of cost-minimisation. Nationally-determined MECA labour prices influence health-
service output through their equality to DHB production-based input marginal productivities.
The system-of-equations nature of the modelling process closely connects health-service output
to changes in input marginal productivity and input market prices.
Employer labour demand must be price-inelastic for unions to persist. A low input price
elasticity allows unions to maintain above-competition wage rates over an extended time period.
Simultaneously estimating production and the labour and capital input markets allows the
labour price-elasticities for different workforce groups to be directly estimated.
The dataset developed within this thesis for the DHB Provider Arms is part of this thesis’
novelty. Neither the production functions, nor the econometric techniques are new. The
developed DHB Provider Arm output measure do, however, describe health-service volume
changes for 84% of DHB Provider Arm health expenditure. Well understood production functions
and econometric techniques, applied to the rich panel data set of monthly Provider Arm output
and inputs measures, have produced some surprisingly good results for what has been, up until
now, an under-explored economic research area of New Zealand’s economy.
The overview of my research is as follows:
2Kaufman2004 on page 353
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• Section 2 briefly describes my findings. The most preferred econometric result and its
interpretation is presented and discussed.
• Section 3 presents economic labour market theory and the economic role of unions. How
unions make decisions has consequences for New Zealand’s health-sector, and the median
voter model of democratic decision-making is described.
• Sections 4 and 5 describes the measurement framework and the data used in this thesis.
The data was derived from primary information sources obtained from the Ministry of
Health (MoH) under the Official Information Act and supplied by District Health Board
Shared Services (DHBSS), a national organisation owned by DHBs.
• Section 6 briefly describes the economic production framework used to explain the interac-
tion between DHBs as economic producers, and the labour markets which they use for
purchasing inputs into economic production. Three separate descriptions of production
are outlined, together with two separate systems-of-equations used to capture market
interactions.
• Section 7 estimates the models described in Section 6 as both single equations of produc-
tion, and as systems-of-equations. Progressing from simplistic two input Cobb-Douglas
production models up to more advanced Constant Elasticity of Substitution, and a Box-Cox
specified production function, this section’s focus is on exploring the underlying properties
of the data, progressively increasing the modelling sophistication. Differences in health
service provider elasticities-of-scale become apparent as the models develop and identify
separate, secondary and tertiary provider groups. Scale differences and differences in
input-intensity also become apparent when labour is differentiated into separate labour
workforce group types.
• Section 8 presents the final Cobb-Douglas specified system-of-equations regression model.
The preferred model included five labour input measures and one capital measure. The
data set developed in sections 5 is a panel dataset which has timeseries and cross-sectional
characteristics. Auto-correlation function analysis over the system-of-equation residuals
suggests only a limited number of DHB Provider Arms display serially-correlated errors,
or hetroskedastic error across the estimated labour markets. The capital market, however,
shows significant serial-correlation of its residuals. The capital market estimated results
12
are considered less reliable than the labour market measures.
Section 8 concludes through exploring the comparative statics of the preferred model
through estimating the impact of labour and capital input changes. The inter-related
nature of the system-of-equations creates initial and induced effects through both the
production and the labour markets which, collectively, impact on DHB Provider Arm total
workforce costs. Comparative static analysis also separates out secondary and tertiary
provider effects.
2 Thesis Findings
rotating
Table (1) reflects the results of a system-of-equations defining DHB Provider Arm production;
the health sector labour markets for five health-sector workforces, and the health-sector capital
market, estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression techniques applied to panel data. The
estimated coefficients are shown with their 95% confidence intervals.
The actual and expected modelling results from Table (1) are graphed in section (8.4).
Across the labour markets, the coefficients of the own labour variables are either negatively
signed, or statistically insignificant, as would be expected from diminishing marginal returns
for each input. Medical and the nursing labour demands are price-inelastic, medical (-0.396)
more than nursing (-0.486). Support labour demand is also price inelastic (-0.593), but less
inelastic than nursing and medical labour. Allied Health’s labour demand elasticity is statistically
insignificant, and Management and administration labour (ManAdmin) labour demand is price-
elastic (-1.105).
The high medical and nursing labour price inelasticity creates the potential for unions to
exploit their “monopoly face”: lifting both labour prices, and reducing employed workforce
volumes, compared to a competitive labour market outcome. The structure of the system-
of-equation modelling introduces a rich depth of complexity to modelling comparative static
changes since disturbances to either the production or the labour markets “perturb” through the
production/labour market system. The inter-related nature of the production function induces
secondary labour market price effects within other workforces.
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The structure of Table (1) implies changes in workforce size and composition have separate
effects on secondary and tertiary provider output depending on the relative sizes of each workforce
and their production function coefficient. However, the labour market impacts reflect the size of
the combined workforces and changes in secondary/tertiary workforce “equilibrate” within the
single labour market which responds to total workforce size.
2.1 Modelling Results
Medical labour makes the largest contribution to health-service volume production for both
secondary and tertiary providers; however, the output volume impact of medical labour change
differs between providers. Increasing medical labour in both secondary and tertiary providers
by 10.0% increases health service output by 6.0% and 3.6% for each provider respectively,
reflecting the higher medical labour productivities within secondary providers. Total Provider
Arm health-service output increases by 4.1% and the total labour cost over all workforces
increases 2.5%.
Table (1) indicates tertiary providers show signs of their nursing workforce being “too large”,
while secondary provider results show there is scope for more nursing employment within their
workforces. If the nursing workforce was rebalanced with no change in the total workforce size
through tertiary providers decreasing their nursing workforce by 10%, and secondary providers
increasing their nursing workforce by 39%, then IF such a change could occur nationally, total
health service output would increase by 3.9% with no additional increase in DHB Provider Arm
workforce costs. Secondary provider output would increase by 9.4%, and tertiary output would
increase by 2.4% for no net increase in labour costs across all DHB Provider Arms.
Changing the allied health workforce employed within DHB Provider Arms has a significant
effect on the labour prices of virtually all other health workforces. A 10% increase in both the
secondary and tertiary provider allied health workforces generates a 2.2% increase in total health
services produced within DHBs while across all DHBs, total labour costs increase 4.1%.
ManAdmin are negatively signed within both secondary and tertiary production functions,
suggesting ManAdmin labour decreases the volume of health-services produced by DHBs.
However, ManAdmin are also negatively signed in the labour market functions suggesting
ManAdmin play a role in affecting labour market prices for different health-sector workforces.
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While the ManAdmin workforces do not directly produce health care, Table (1) suggests they
actively decrease the cost of employing other workforces, potentially through improving workforce
co-ordination, and generating workforce efficiencies.
2.2 Labour Demand Price Elasticities and the Changing Composition of the
DHB Provider Arm Workforce
The relative workforce labour demand price elasticities have been a fundamental determinant
of DHB Provider Arm workforce composition. With medical labour having the lowest price
elasticity of all workforces, workforce labour cost inflation has altered the composition of the
DHB Provider Arm workforces. The relative workforce composition of DHBs has become more
relatively3 medical-dominant over time (see Figures (1) - (4)).
Labour costs, negotiated with unions through the national MECAs, have resulted in DHBs
responding to price increases according to their production-based labour marginal productivities
and labour demand elasticities. As labour costs have inflated, the relative difference in each
workforce’s labour demand price elasticity have altered the composition of virtually all DHB’s
workforces. Each DHB has become more relatively medical-intensive, reflecting medical labour’s
lower price elasticity compared to other workforces.
Economic theory suggests unions induce allocative inefficiency: they alter relative prices
and lead to input distortions which would otherwise not occur within a competitive market.
Figures (1) - (4) are evidence of the distortionary effect induced through allocative inefficiency.
For the health-sector, a higher employment proportion of medical labour has been induced by
the allocative inefficiencies stemming from the cumulative effects of centrally-negotiated MECA
agreements on labour prices.
Paradoxically, for the health system, from Table (1), increasing the medical workforce would
make the largest contribution for increasing health service output for both secondary and tertiary
providers. The low medical labour demand price elasticity in Table (1), reflected in high medical
labour costs, has resulted in fewer medical workforce employed then would be allocatively
efficient. High medical costs have created medical workforce scarcity such that medical labour
has now become the input which has the greatest impact on the production of health services,
hence their estimated production contribution from Table (1).
3Not absolutely dominated
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Recent media reports suggest graduate nurses and medically-trained migrants face difficulty
getting employed within DHBs.4 Limited job opportunities for graduates and overseas entrants
seeking employment within New Zealand’s labour market are the predicted outcomes from the
union effects described in section 3.
Overseas-trained workforce, attracted by the high labour earnings available within the
unionised New Zealand health-sector labour markets, find themselves shut out of the same
non-competitive labour market that confers unions their monopoly power, despite the economic
benefit increased medical labour would generate in increased health services. Likewise, nursing
graduates who might prefer employment at less than union wages closer to a competitive wage
rate find no voice within a union focused on its employed members interests.
The uncertainty is what happens to trained workforces who cannot secure DHB employment
and choose to remain within New Zealand’s health-sector. Section 3 suggests they secure
employment within non-unionised roles at below competitive labour rates, potentially waiting
until they become attractive for a unionised role. The Disability Support Service (DSS) and
Aged Care industry would seem likely candidates for readily-available private sector employment
within the health industry. Figures (45), derived from Figure (44) suggest the DSS workforce
are both the lowest paid, and the workforce who has received the least wage inflation of the
health-sector industries. Whether the witnessed income changes reflect a large number of highly
trained workforce, who have failed to secure DHB employment employed in the DSS workforce,
pushing down labour prices, or the competitive labour rates for a less skilled workforce is a
largely unknown question.
4http://tvnz.co.nz/national-news/nursing-graduates-struggling-find-work-5805893 and
http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/240482/foreign-doctors-demand-action-on-jobs
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3 Labour Markets and Unions: Economic Theory
Theory suggests unions expropriate economic surpluses from alternative sources of wealth for
the pecuniary gain of their members and, in the process, decrease societal welfare and distort
economic efficiency. Unions increase wages, induce firms to hire less labour and employ more
capital per worker, or hire higher quality labour than is needed. Unions function as “rent-seeking
institutions that use monopoly power to transfer economic surplus from other economic agents
to their members”.5
That perspective is viewed against the counter-factual of the competitive labour market
which, union proponents argue, misses a positive non-wage effect: union “collective voice” which
offset their “monopoly face”.
3.1 The Positive Side of Unions
3.1.1 Collective Voice / Institutional Response
[Freeman and Medoff(1979)] argue unions do not reduce economic efficiency or generate inequal-
ity: unions increase worker productivity, and enhance workforce equality. In the absence of
a union, workers have one mode for redressing workplace grievances: exiting the employment
position. If the labour market is competitive, unfairly treated or under-paid workers can improve
their work conditions through moving. Under-paying employers find replacement labour only at
the higher competitive market price. A sub-competitive workplace will fail to attract replacement
labour into a vacated role.
[Freeman and Medoff(1979)] accept unions raise wages above competitive levels (their monopoly
face), but maintain unions generate offsetting non-wage effects (through their collective voice)
that, overall, societal welfare is not reduced. Providing workers a voice in both an employment
and a political setting, unions improve the economic and social system. Unions engage the
employment parties into a political process involving conversations on the problems workers
perceive in the workplace. [Freeman and Medoff(1979)] offer four reasons why union collective
voice counteracts the negative effects of their “monopoly face”.
Employment terms and conditions have quasi-public-good aspects to them. All employees
5[Kaufman(2004)] on page 353
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are affected by their employment conditions but free-rider issues prevent individual workers
initiating change. The benefits of the corrective action accrue to the collective while the costs of
correction are borne by the individual. Unions, representing the collective, are best placed to
lead workplace and employment change and spread correction costs over all workers that benefit.
Secondly, employees who remain in employment roles are unlikely to voice their concerns. A
power imbalance between employees and employers means disgruntled workers who remain in
their roles lose their ability to voice their displeasure. Without the ability to leave, employees
choose not to complain through fear of employer retribution. Unions dilute managerial authority
and allow workers an ability to object to managerial decisions.
In competitive labour markets, employment terms and conditions are set at the margin by
the behaviour of workers who are prepared to exit/enter an employment role. These tended
to be younger, more mobile workers, resulting in employers focusing on their interests. The
interests of the “infra-marginal” worker who stays are overlooked. “Infra-marginal” workers
tend to be older members of the workforce. Unions consider the interests of all the workers,
not just those willing to leave. As political institutions with elected leaders, unions respond to
different signals than those of the competitive labour market.6
Finally, unions improve workplace productivity, reduce workforce churn, and lower employer
costs from exiting and entering employees. Under unionism, promotions become less dependent
on individual performance and more related to other aspects like seniority. The workforce are
more likely to act co-operatively and promote collective-learning. Unions force employers to
respond to union demands whilst maintaining profitability, encouraging management to remove
any X-inefficiency within the firm’s production processes. That level of stimulation may not
exist within a non-unionised workforce.
3.2 The Monopoly Face of Unions
[Kaufman(2004)], publishing twenty five years after [Freeman and Medoff(1979)], focused on
union-related microeconomic theory. Most economists view unions as akin to a labour market
monopoly, which like enterprise monopolies in productive markets, are no less desirable because
they raise prices above the competitive level which would prevail in the absence of the monopoly.7
6[Freeman and Medoff(1979)] on page 6
7[Kaufman(2004)] on page 351
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A union’s monopoly face generates price distortions that induce an inefficient mix of factors-of-
production, and a misallocation of resources between unions and the non-union sector.8
Figure 5: Labour Market Economic Theory: Graphic
Figure (5) graphically summarises the union-related labour market economic theory. In a
competitive labour market, the interaction between labour supply and demand would result
in a quantity of labour, L0, employed at a price (wage rate) of W0. A union, if successful in
obtaining members and organising the workforce, gains market power over the supply of labour
which it uses to increase union member’s collective utility.
In the theoretical model, member utility is a function of their labour wages and the number
of employed persons within the labour market. In Figure (5), the union expresses its member’s
preferences through the indifference curve I1 which reflects the trade-off between higher wages
(W2) and employed roles (L2). If the union’s activities are successful, both industry wages
increase and induced labour unemployment is minimised.
The effect of less employed labour is a reduction in the volume of goods and services produced
within the output market. If industry output actually contracts through firms closing down, some
union members directly bear the cost of the higher wage gains achieved by other union members
8[Kaufman(2004)] on page 352
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through becoming unemployed. However, if industry contraction can occur through dissuading
new firms from entering a shrunken output market, then employment and production losses are
borne by hypothetical firms who could have entered a competitive market and employed labour
up to the competitive market equilibrium.
Restricting the potential for the labour market and output markets to expand is the ideal
outcome for unions: none of their existing voting members are affected by the union’s monopoly
face, and all enjoy the benefits of higher wages. However, the cost of the union wage and
employment distortions are borne by new or prospective labour market entrants and consumers.
New labour market entrants are excluded from employment by the lower production and
employment opportunities in the unionised industry. Consumer consumption choices are restricted
by less quantity of goods/services available, or less choice of supplier from whom they can choose.
Consumers may also face higher output good/service prices.
The increase in labour costs increases the cost-of-production for all unionised firms within
the industry. If production cost increases are passed on to consumers, then whether consumers
or producers “bear” the burden of cost increases depends on the relative output market demand
and supply price elasticities. Producers will have difficulty passing on cost increases if output
demand is price-elastic. Producer profitability will decline, and producers will exit the industry.
If output demand is price-inelastic, consumers bear the union labour cost increase through higher
output prices.
A decrease in producers also results in fewer employment opportunities opening up within
the unionised workforce. Over time, the range of employment opportunities becomes limited to
fewer employers who can afford the higher unionised wage rates. The labour demand curve in
Figure (5) “flattens” and becomes more sensitive to price changes. If higher labour costs are
maintained, the employed workforce further declines.
3.2.1 Labour Supply and Price-Signalling Effects
If unions have been successful in increasing wages to W2, W2 intersects with labour supply
at L3. The unionised wage “attracts” L3 entrants into a labour market whose employment is
constrained to a lower L2 level. Excess demand is created for unionised jobs and positions within
the industry. Unsuccessful workers queue for union jobs, remaining unemployed until a vacancy
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opens, leave the labour market altogether, or migrate to the non-union sector and search for
employment there.
If non-unionised firms exist within the industry, and unsuccessful workers do migrate to
non-unionised firms, the L3 labour supply exerts downward pressure on non-unionised wages. If
wages are flexible in the non-unionised firms, the excess labour supply (L3 − L2) is employed
at a below-competition wage rate, W3, by non-unionised producers. Non-unionised producers
not only face lower wage prices, compared to their unionised competitors, but sell their output
goods/services at the higher-than-competitive output price of their unionised competitors.
If both union and non-union employers have similarly skilled workforces, the lower wage,
W3, received by the non-unionised workforce creates workforce inequality between workers.
Consequently, non-union employers receive a windfall advantage as their costs-of-production
are significantly lower than unionised employers. Non-union employers also enjoy less price
competition from unionised employers who have higher costs-of-production.9
3.3 Rent-seeking and Incident of a “Union Tax”
Unions produce a dead-weight loss that can be modelled as a“union tax”.10 Like taxes in general,
“a tax will raise more revenue the more inelastic (less price sensitive) is the demand for the good
being taxed and the less opportunity economic agents have to evade it.”11
An inelastic employer demand for labour is crucial for union long-term success. The more
inelastic the demand for labour, the smaller the loss in employment for any given union wage
increase and the greater the potential increase in wages for union members. The less price-
sensitive consumers are in the product market, the less wage-sensitive producers are in the labour
market. If firms can ‘pass-through’ cost increases to consumers, employers are more willing to
concede to union labour demands, and consumers ultimately bear the cost of the union tax.
Union monopoly power is maximised if the entire output market is price-inelastic. Firms
within a monopolistic, or oligopolistic industry who have market power can pass on price increases
to consumers. “Non-market” Government-supplied output markets are similar to monopoly
provider output markets, since the entire industry responds to the funding signals of a single
9[Kaufman(2004)] on page 353
10Triangles (A-B-C) and (A-E-F) in Figure (5).
11[Kaufman(2004)] on page 354
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revenue source and decision-maker. Consumers lack substitutes to the government-provided
service and the output product market is price-inelastic.
If product markets were competitive, the ability for unions to raise wages and other labour
conditions above market levels would be very limited. Competitive product markets imply firms
are only generating competitive rates of return on capital. If unions try to increase labour’s rate
of return, firms will close as capital seeks higher returns elsewhere with resulting union member
unemployment.
3.4 Source of Surplus Value for Expropriation
When product markets are imperfectly competitive, the prospects for successful union rent-
seeking significantly increase, particularly amongst regulated industries. Unions are able to tap
into the super-normal rent aspect of industry production, leaving the competitive rate-of-return
untouched for capital remuneration. Even if the product market is competitive, unions may seek
to increases wages and labour costs over competitive levels and extract economic surplus.
Union monopoly effects can persist if labour cost increases are accompanied with productivity
increases. Increased productivity generates a surplus from which higher labour costs can be
funded, leaving capital to be remunerated at its competitive level. Surplus value, derived from
productivity gains, can be entirely directed by unions towards their members.
Secondly, if the adjustment horizon over which firms can exit and enter a market is long,
unions may extract surplus while firms exit a market over a prolonged period. If a firm has
high capital asset-specificity, making exiting a market difficult to practically implement, unions
can exploit the long adjustment periods to extract returns over a “short term”, which may last
several years.
Thirdly, [Kaufman(2004)] notes that if some firms have lower cost structures than others,
or a non-reproducible factor-of-production which secures them an economic advantage (like an
advantageous physical location), then that source of surplus is available for unions to extract.
Surplus value from innovation or novelty becomes captured by the workforce.
The nature of the production technology may make producers labour-price insensitive and
create inelastic labour demand. If labour, capital and other inputs in the production process
have a low elasticity of substitution, producers face difficulty replacing unionised labour with
27
alternative cheaper inputs. Producers with low input substitution elasticities have an inelastic
labour demand curve that can be exploited by unions.
Reducing the production input substitution elasticity may be a deliberate union strat-
egy. Entrenching specific roles, workforce mixes, or maintaining specific role demarcations
reinforce/entrench union power through deliberately reducing labour’s substitutability.12
If the elasticity of substitution is low, producers and the non-unionised workforce bear the
cost of the “union tax”.
3.5 Cost of Unionisation
Positive economics perceives unions negatively through the inefficiencies and distortions to
production which they introduce. Competitively determined relative prices lead to an efficient
allocation of resources across firms and industries. Competitive markets are Pareto efficient:
it is impossible to reallocate resources so as to make any economic agent better off without
simultaneously making another worse off. When unions increase labour costs, they distort
input price relativities leading to a misallocation of resources between alternative uses, creating
inefficiencies in production, and generating dead-weight social welfare losses.13
3.5.1 Loss of Allocative Efficiency
Allocative efficiency between industries requires input market prices equating to industry-based
marginal-input-productivities. Competitive market prices direct labour towards industries with
higher labour productivity. If identical labour has higher marginal productivities within one
industry over another, then allocative efficiency requires labour to migrate between industries
and reflect the high productivity in one industry over the other. If productive resources do
move to reflect marginal productivity differences, then social welfare increases as more output is
generated from the same inputs used in production.
Union monopoly power distorts labour market prices, misallocating labour resources between
industries. Unions that increase wages attract “too much” labour into a unionised industry’s
labour market (L3 − L2 in Figure (5)), implying another industry exists that has “too little”
labour for its industry’s marginal labour productivity.
12[Kaufman(2004)] page 355
13[Kaufman(2004)] at p355
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Maintaining wages artificially high at W2 attracts a higher quality of labour into the industry
than is otherwise needed from a competitive market. Highly skilled labour which could earn
W2 competitively in other industries are instead drawn into the unionised industry by the
higher-than-competitive wage signals artificially generated by unions. Workers with adequate
skills and capability to deliver L0 service at W0 are excluded from the employment market by
the calibre of workforce attracted into the labour market by the higher unionised wage.
If unions successfully increase labour costs over their competitive levels, then the capi-
tal/labour price relativities become distorted. Ironically, capital becomes “too cheap” compared
to labour. The higher relative labour-per-capital cost induces firms to invest in more capital
than needed compared to the competitive market. Unions unambiguously decrease labour, but
capital investment may increase as firms seek to maintain production levels.
3.5.2 Loss of Technical Efficiency
Technical efficiency occurs when the maximum possible output is produced from a given combi-
nation of inputs. Technical efficiency implies cost-minimisation and the absence of organisational
slack. Unions reduce technical efficiency through advocating non-cost-minimising policies and
processes that confer benefits to their members not otherwise achievable through a technically-
efficient competitive market.14
Some of the technical-efficiency-reducing union practices identified in the literature include
the following:
• “Feather-bedding” / make-work rules
Feather-bedding occurs when excess labour is employed to perform a given role or task.
The phrase originates from the American railway unions who, facing changing technology,
sought to preserve their jobs through negotiating contracts requiring employers to pay
workers for doing little or no work, or which involved complex and time-consuming work
rules that generated a full day’s work for an employee who otherwise would have been
made redundant.15
• Narrow role delineation
Narrow job descriptions that split up tasks into multiple spheres of responsibility across
14[Kaufman(2004)] on page 356
15http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Featherbedding
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separate trades or occupations decrease technical efficiency. Narrow role descriptions
decrease the elasticity of substitution for employment roles through increasing the inter-
dependency of different roles on each other. Narrow roles expand the workforce and the
potential for increased union membership.
• Promotion /Disciplinary restrictions
Union seeking to de-couple employment promotion processes from the recognition of
an individual’s labour productivity, reduce technical efficiency through disconnecting
remuneration from the workforce’s marginal revenue product. Conversely, disciplinary
restrictions that prevent employers correcting issues relating to an individual’s conduct,
their productivity, their performance of their role, or the risks they create reduces technical
efficiency.
3.6 Median Voter Models of Union Behaviour
Unions do not “own” labour: they negotiate a labour price with employers that both workers
and employers agree to honour. A union operates more like a cartel of individual producers who
join together to set a monopoly price for their services.
The Median Voter (MV) model is one description for how union’s reconcile the preferences
of individual union members into a coherent bargaining strategy. The MV model assumes union
leaders choose bargaining options which are put to a democratic vote by the union members. A
simple majority is needed for any one option to become the preferred bargaining position for
employer negotiation. The MV model theorises the outcome of a democratic vote will reflect the
“median voter’s” preferences and collective interests.
Median voter models introduce an element of democracy into union negotiations: the union’s
bargaining position reflects the view and interests of their collective members. The adoption of
a democratic voting process that expresses the ‘will of the majority’ obscures union rent-seeking
activity. Union demands are the outcome of a democratic process, and are more likely to be
perceived as reflecting a genuine desire to redress a “legitimate” employment grievance affecting
the collective, rather then the transfer of economic surplus from other economic agents to a
self-interested employed workforce.
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3.6.1 Insider-Outsider Collective Coercion
An implication of the MV model is that unions not only redistribute income from consumers,
firms and non-union workers to union members, but they also redistribute income amongst
the union members themselves. As unions bargain, some members gain more than others.
Consequently, the aspects which union’s negotiate over reflect, in part, the internal dynamics of
the union: an insider-outsider form of coercion against minority interests.
One MV voter preference structure discussed in the literature focuses on member preferences
that systematically differ by member employment seniority. If low-seniority union members differ
in their employment expectations from high-seniority members, then the negative unemployment
effects of the union monopoly face may disproportionately impact junior union members if the
“median voter” is more like senior members than junior members. The higher wage expectations
of senior members disproportionately shape the union’s collective wage demands, but the job
losses from the high demands disproportionally fall upon the junior members.
3.6.2 Bargaining Positions as Expressions of Union Political Dynamics
[Kaufman(2004)]16 notes that the bargaining positions presented by unions themselves can reveal
aspects of the internal politics within the union. Bargaining positions that include minimum
work-sizes or other aspects that are “make work” are likely not to be important for unions
with expanding membership compared to unions whose members risk displacement through new
technology. Similarly, a union is likely to reject employer demands for a pay cut, unless the
threat of job losses are so large that agreeing to the cut is in the member’s best interests.
Insider-outsider collective dynamics have important implications for graduates without
experience or graduates looking to enter the market place. As non-members of an existing union,
their preferences, more aligned to the competitive W0, do not feature in the union’s “preference
set” when formulating bargaining positions. The interests of prospective entrants into a labour
market find no expression in a unionised industry, which neither offers them employment on
competitive terms and conditions, nor access to unionised employment which reflects the interests
of currently employed members.
Inside unions, voting coalitions can form which may attempt to use collective decision-making
16On page 362
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democracy to redistribute union gains to their coalition members and away from minority
interests outside the coalition. For example, wage standardising and wage levelling are an
outcome which moves the majority of the union wage-gains towards the lower end of the member
spectrum at the cost of members in the higher end whose wage-rates are reduced. Likewise,
rather than focusing on performance-related remuneration structures, unions reflect the interests
of members who are less likely to leave for more competitive conditions. For incumbents, a
non-performance related remuneration package reflecting automatically obtained employment
benefits like health insurance, pensions, or child-care packages reflects their preferences and
becomes the union bargaining position through the MV model.
3.7 Countering Monopsony Employment Power
Unions can be an effective counter to employer monopsony power. Monopsonistic employment
conditions occur when a single firm, or a cartel of firms, become single monopoly purchasers of
labour. While a monopoly increases prices in output markets above their competitive position,
monopsonists use their single employer market power to lower labour prices below their market
position, where competitive prices would have been set by labour’s marginal revenue product.
Under this scenario, union monopoly power can act as an effective counter-balance to the
employer monopsony power, prevent worker exploitation and move the employment level and
wages towards a more competitive market position.
[Kaufman(2004)] argues most economists believe labour markets have become more com-
petitive over time, with increased labour geographic mobility, improved job information, and
a larger number of employers within local areas. The “classic” one-company-town monopsony
employer is seen as a historical curiosity. Other sources of worker “lock in”, like job knowledge
specificity or training, are seen as not only tying the workforce to the employer, but also tying
the employer to the workforce creating an effective bilateral monopoly.
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4 DHB Health Service Output and Input Measurement
This thesis estimates a gross output, national-health-expenditure based-weighted composite
Laspeyres activity-based health-service output index. The source financial and health-service
output data was obtained from the MoH through an Official Information Act request, and
reflects MoH definitions and terminology.
The “commodities” within the output index are Major Service Group (MSG) level estimates
of health service output volumes. The base-weights used to combine the MSG commodities
together are national health service expenditure shares for each MSG derived from estimates
of total MSG health expenditure in the 2011 financial year. The MSG group commodities are
themselves sub-indices derived from cost-weighted activity-based output measures for services
within each MSG.
Algebraically,
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Where:
q0i , q
t
i are output volume indices in periods 0 and 1 of i = 1,.,n MSG output volume indices.
c0m is the base period health-service prices, derived from either the DHB Production Plans or
PUC price estimates for inter-DHB transfer pricing.
h0m, h
t
m are activity-based volumes measures in periods 0 and 1 of m = 1,.,r homogeneous PUC
health-service commodities.
v0i = p
0
i × q0i where p0i is a national estimate of health expenditure spent for each MSG-based
estimate of qi, and S
0
i represents the health expenditure share for each MSG within the base
year.
As a consequence of the relationship between total value and volume output measures
described in equation (10), equation (3) describes the implicit Paasche price index which is the
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dual price measure to the output measure defined in equation (1).
Pprice =
Iv
L(Output)
(3)
Equation (3)’s Paasche price index represents the underlying price change associated with
changes in DHB Provider Arm output and DHB Provider Arm total expenditure. It is an
implicitly derived measure of DHB Provider Arm output cost inflation.
4.0.1 The National Service Framework
The National Service Framework17 (NSFW) describes health-service commodities. The MoH
and DHBs maintain the NSFW as part of the accountability requirements between the MoH and
DHBs.18 The NSFW describes health services according to a well-defined and well-managed
health-service commodity classification system that standardises the description of health-service
activities into “Purchase Unit Codes” (PUC).19 PUC measurement definition and quality is
maintained through a set of nationally agreed Common Counting Standards for PUC measurement
and reporting.20
4.0.2 DHB Provider Arm Production Plans
DHBs are required to submit annual Production Plans to the MoH that reflect the volume and
type of health-services they intend to purchase from either their Provider Arm or through their
Funder Arm, and the per unit price they intend to pay for each PUC component of planned
health care.21,22 Each health-service PUC “price” is a price in the economic sense since it
represents an exchange of value in return for the provision of health services to the DHB’s
local population. However, in practice, Production Plan “prices”, especially for health-services
purchased from the DHB’s Provider Arm, tend to reflect the Provider Arm’s costs of health care
delivery rather than the outcome of an arms-length transaction between two separate parties
negotiating for the provision of health care.
17http://www.nsfl.health.govt.nz/apps/nsfl.nsf/menumh/Home
18http://www.nsfl.health.govt.nz/apps/nsfl.nsf/menumh/Accountability+Documents
19http://www.nsfl.health.govt.nz/apps/nsfl.nsf/pagesmh/462
20http://www.nsfl.health.govt.nz/apps/nsfl.nsf/pagesmh/463/$File/Common+Counting+Standards+2012+2013.pdf
21http://www.nsfl.health.govt.nz/apps/nsfl.nsf/menumh/Accountability+Documents
22http://www.nsfl.health.govt.nz/apps/nsfl.nsf/pagesmh/200/$File/Production+Plan+2013-
14+template v2 Dec12.xlsx
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4.0.3 Weighted Inlier Equivalent Separation (WIES) units of measure
A significant number of PUCs are defined in terms of “Cost Weighted Discharges”, a term
synonymous with “Case Weighted Discharges” or “Casemix Funded Events”. In contrast,
“Cost Weights” are a set of service-based weights derived from historical patterns of patient
expenditure stratified by patient age, sex, ethnicity and NZDep2001 characteristics, and used
in the Population Based Funding Formula for funding DHBs.23 To avoid confusion, the term
“Case Weighted Discharges” (CWD) will be used throughout this thesis to refer to WIES units
of measure.
A CWD is a health-service unit of measure based on the Australian Victorian State’s
system of Casemix funding first introduced by the Victorians in 1993. Casemix funding has
an extensive history in both Australia and New Zealand, and although no longer used to fund
New Zealand DHBs, in Australia, Casemix funding has recently expanded in scope and defines
a component of all Australian public hospital funding.24 The methodology shares significant
intellectual parallels with the United Kingdom’s Pay by Results approach to funding its National
health-service.25 Since its first introduction in 2000, New Zealand has developed and expanded
the WIES methodology to reflect differences between the New Zealand and Victorian health
systems.26
Case weighted discharges are a resource-based volume measure derived from the WIES
methodology that measures the relative resources used in the delivery of inpatient heath care.
The WIES methodology defines health services according to an international classification of
patient disease-related diagnosis and treatment. The classification that governs the description of
Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) health-service commodities in New Zealand is the Australian
Modification of the World Health Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10-
AM).27 In New Zealand, every publicly-funded inpatient event is clinically coded to its relevant
ICD-10-AM codes reflecting both the patient’s diagnosis and treatment. The coded events are
grouped into larger clusters of activity that are diagnostically related to form DRGs.28
Each DRG receives a “case weight” that represents the proportion of a “unit price” needed
23http://www.moh.govt.nz/notebook/nbbooks.nsf/0/dd8c56491558f0fbcc256e8f007e566d/$FILE/PopulationBasedFundingFormula2003.pdf
24http://www.ihpa.gov.au/internet/ihpa/publishing.nsf/Content/about-us
25http://www.dh.gov.uk/health/category/policy-areas/nhs/resources-for-managers/payment-by-results/
26http://www.health.govt.nz/nz-health-statistics/data-references/weighted-inlier-equivalent-separations
27http://meteor.aihw.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/360927
28http://www.health.govt.nz/nz-health-statistics/data-references/code-tables/common-code-tables/drg-code-
table
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to compensate health-service providers for care. For example, in 2012, WIESNZ12 estimated
that DRG “A05Z - Heart Transplant” health services consumed approximately 31.6 CWDs per
inpatient event.29 On average, Heart Transplant patients were admitted for approximately 43
bed days. In comparison, the treatment of DRG “F74Z - Chest Pain” consumed approximately
0.36 CWDs per inpatient event and patients were, on average, discharged after slightly over 1
day. Consequently, Heart Transplant patients consume approximately 8,678 percent more health
resources than Chest Pain patients. In 2012, the unit price per CWD was $4,614.36. As a result,
on average, Heart Transplants cost DHBs $145,814 per inpatient event. Chest Pain patients cost
$1,661 per inpatient event.
4.1 Aggregating Volumes Across Dissimilar Health Services
Most health-service providers produce a range of health-service commodities. Within the NSFW,
the Medical MSG alone identifies 212 different PUCs. Even a comparably small MSG, like
Disability Support Services, has approximately 100 distinct PUC health-service commodities.
Measuring Provider Arm output requires distilling the information content from the hundreds of
different health-service commodities into a single unitary output measure that reflects the size
and breadth of health-service volume changes occurring between periods.
Much of the value providers receive in exchange for health-services is supplied by the
Government on behalf of New Zealanders. DHB health care is free for New Zealand residents.
”De-coupling” health care services from patient payments for care is what defines the health-
sector as a “non-market” industry. However, the lack of an objectively determined price between
producers and consumers hampers the formation of an output measure since there are no output
service valuations patients objectively place on the health care they receive from DHB Provider
Arms.
4.1.1 DHB Production Plan Prices as Substitutes for Market Prices
DHB Production Plans require DHBs to describe a purchase price they intend to pay for health-
services, either from their Provider Arm directly or from private provider’s funded through the
DHB’s Funder Arm. While the Production Plan price reflects an estimate of the health-service’s
cost it does link DHB total funding budgets to health-service purchasing decisions.
29http://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/pages/wiesnz12-use-with-ar-drg-6-0-adapted-nz.xls
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Production Plan prices are not the outcome of an arms-length market transaction between
the DHB’s Funder and Provider Arms. However, they do reflect a trade-off DHBs make between
different types of health-services that are affordable from their budgets. Despite the absence
of an output market, DHB Production Plan prices reflect resource scarcity and influence DHB
purchasing decisions.
4.2 Price and Volume Index Theory
A price index is a weighted average of the changes in prices for a specific set of goods and
services between two periods of time. Similarly, a volume index is a weighted average of the
proportionate changes in the volumes of a set of goods and services between two periods of
time. The two most commonly used index formulae are the Laspeyres and Paasche indices which
together share a unique relationship that can be exploited for applied health-sector economic
analysis.
A Laspeyres volume index is:
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represents the value shares of commodity i in period 0.
A Paasche price index is:
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The Paasche price index in equation (6) reflects the change in the value of a basket of health-
service commodities whose prices change in different periods, weighted in each year by the
quantities purchased in the current period base period.
Both Laspeyres and the Paasche indices are “base weighted” indices with the Laspeyres
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index setting the earlier period as the base period and the Paasche index setting the later period
as the base period. Between two periods, the total change in the value of all health-services
purchased in each year is:
Iv =
∑n
i=1 v
t
i∑n
i=1 v
t−1
i
(7)
Equation (7) is a total value measure, and reflects the combination of changes in health-service
volumes and changes in health-service prices between each period.
When Laspeyres and Paasche indices are used, the change in total value calculated in equation
(7) will exactly decompose into a price index multiplied by a volume index such that:
• A Laspeyres price index together with a Paasche volume index will exactly equal the
change in total value:
LP × PQ = Iv (8)
• A Laspeyres volume index together with a Paasche price index will also exactly equal the
change in total value:
LQ × PP = Iv (9)
The relationship between Laspeyres indices, Paasche indices and total value measures implies
only two of the three measures need to be known before the third can be derived. If both a
Laspeyres volume index and total value measure are known, then together they implicitly define
a Paasche price index as a dual price measure:
PP = Iv/LQ (10)
Equation (10), which establishes a price relationship between changes in value and changes in
quantity, can be used to derive a price inflation measure which represents either a Laspeyres or a
Paasche counterpart index for the explicitly measured volume index. If the explicitly measured
quantity index has significant data coverage, it can be used in conjunction with measures of
total health expenditure, total labour cost, or total economic capital spent, to derive an implicit
cost price inflation measure which is the counterpart to the quantity index.
Equation (10) is used extensively within this thesis to estimate aggregate labour costs,
total health-service cost inflation and to derive an implicit estimate of changes in total capital
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consumed within the production process.
5 Data Sources and Methods
The majority of information used within this thesis comes from the MoH’s DHB monitoring
sources. The MoH collects monthly data on DHB balance sheet, and profit and loss position. At
the end of each financial year, the monthly measures are aggregated into national-level MSG
estimates of health-service expenditure. Figure (10), at the end of this section, graphically
present the DHB health service output measures for each DHB Provider Arm.
MoH data was used to create the health-service output measures used for production analysis.
Through its role as custodian of the National Data Collections30, the MoH collects a vast array of
health-service delivery information. Not all the information is immediately suitable for economic
analysis. Section 5.2 describes how output measures were derived from detailed low-level source
information, predominately from the National Collections.
5.1 Financial Information
5.1.1 Ministry of Health DHB Monitoring Data
Profit and loss, and balance sheet data was sourced from monthly information collected by the
MoH as part of the monitoring function it undertakes as agent for the Minister of Health.31
The MoH uses the monthly information to create reports for the Minister of Health on DHB
financial performance.
At the end of every financial year, the MoH compiles the monitoring information into an
estimate for the value of expenditure spent across different MSG health-services. Unlike the
monthly DHB profit and loss monitoring reports, that reflect health expenditure spent on inputs
to production, the DHB national health expenditure monitoring information considers health
expenditure by MSG output area. Table (2), derived from the annual expenditure estimates,
shows how DHB Provider Arm expenditure for different MSGs has changed over time.
30http://www.health.govt.nz/nz-health-statistics/national-collections-and-surveysmega=Health%20statistics&title=National%20collections%20and%20surveys
31http://www.health.govt.nz/new-zealand-health-system/key-health-sector-organisations-and-people/district-
health-boards/accountability-and-funding/summary-financial-reports
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Financial Year DSS Maori Health Maternity Medical Mental Health Neonatal Outpatients Paediatrics Public Health Remainder Surgical
2004 131,423 869 113,763 425,977 561,227 54,262 318,251 357,037 -66 1,185,873 539,934
2005 182,722 611 123,061 445,146 597,205 49,284 364,346 73,405 4,023 1,610,235 611,159
2006 193,519 1,006 126,201 490,180 635,064 54,002 387,012 77,635 9,185 1,806,643 661,578
2007 169,812 670 123,992 526,935 693,063 57,823 443,395 89,913 1,683 1,975,921 712,140
2008 220,999 1,243 144,922 648,047 743,477 66,732 506,603 104,358 3,592 1,945,941 878,262
2009 240,407 3,937 201,693 929,227 794,349 110,649 807,151 200,283 12,963 1,071,771 1,376,316
2010 274,603 2,861 255,842 1,082,949 844,854 126,877 812,310 220,022 12,456 1,064,032 1,538,055
2011 279,844 4,909 274,100 1,138,656 861,871 126,044 855,782 230,089 22,246 1,026,095 1,656,700
Table 2: DHB Provider Arm Health Expenditure Over Time ($000)
5.1.2 The Base Period
The 2011 financial year was chosen as the base period for estimating MSG health expenditure
base-weights for a health-service output index. Table (2) expenditure measures for 2011 were
chosen as the expenditure weights s0i in equation (5).
Laspeyres-based health-services quantity indices were derived for all of the MSG commodities
in Table (2). The health-service expenditure weights in Table (3), derived from Table (2) for the
2011 base year, were used to combine the different MSG sub-indices of health-services into a single
composite total health-service output index for each DHB. Excluding the “Remainder” group,
which lacks robust underlying health-service quantity measures, the derived DHB Provider Arm
output quantity index reflects health-service quantity change for 84% of the health expenditure
received by DHB Provider Arms.
Financial Year Major Service Group 2011 Expenditure Total Provider Expenditure Output Index Weight
2011 DSS 279,844 6,476,336 0.04321
2011 Maori Health 4,909 6,476,336 0.00076
2011 Maternity 274,100 6,476,336 0.04232
2011 Medical 1,138,656 6,476,336 0.17582
2011 Mental Health 861,871 6,476,336 0.13308
2011 Neonatal 126,044 6,476,336 0.01946
2011 Outpatients 855,782 6,476,336 0.13214
2011 Paediatrics 230,089 6,476,336 0.03553
2011 Public Health 22,246 6,476,336 0.00343
2011 Remainder 1,026,095 6,476,336 0.15844
2011 Surgical 1,656,700 6,476,336 0.25581
Table 3: DHB Provider Arm Health-Service Output BaseWeights
5.2 MSG-Level Output Quantity Measures
The MoH’s Information Group has responsibility for the ”National Collections” of health and
disability information.32 DHB Provider Arm health-services are split between two broad “types”
of care: inpatient health-services, where the patient receives care which warrants them being
admitted for a minimum of four hours or longer, and “non-inpatient” health-services, where the
patient presents at the DHB for care, but is usually discharged from hospital within four hours.
32http://www.health.govt.nz/nz-health-statistics/national-collections-and-surveys/collections
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“Non-inpatient” care is also described as “Outpatient” care.
5.2.1 Inpatient Health Services
The National Minimum Dataset (NMDS)33 was used as the primary data source for measuring
inpatient health-service volumes across different MSGs. WIES version WIES11C34 CWD
measures were used to estimate inpatient DHB Provider Arm health-service volumes for the
Surgical, Medical, Maternity, Paediatrics, and Neonatal MSGs.
5.2.2 Non-Inpatient Health Services
The National Non-Admitted Patients Collection35 (NNPAC) data, processed and cleaned by
the National Health Board was used to measure the volume of non-inpatient care delivered by
DHBs.
Historically, NNPAC data has suffered from data quality issues.36 The MoH spent significant
effort reconciling NNPAC data with other sources of information to develop as reliable a measure
of non-inpatient health-service activity as possible. Unfortunately, reconciling and cleaning
NNPAC data results in a loss of time frequency. The non-inpatient data used in this thesis is
cleansed annual NNPAC information provided by the National Health Board.
5.2.3 Disability Support Services
WIES CWD measures are not defined for DSS health services. DSS health services were identified
within NMDS through testing the first character of the health speciality code.37 If the first
character of the health speciality code within the NMDS patient record was a “D”, then the
inpatient event was identified as a DSS event. The length of the inpatient stay was used as the
quantity measure for the volume of DSS health service the patient received.
33http://www.health.govt.nz/nz-health-statistics/national-collections-and-surveys/collections/national-
minimum-dataset-hospital-events
34http://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/pages/wies11c-methodology.doc
35http://www.health.govt.nz/nz-health-statistics/national-collections-and-surveys/collections/national-non-
admitted-patient-collection
36http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse for stats/economic indicators/productivity/measuring-govt-
productivity/8-data-availability-health-care.aspx
37http://www.health.govt.nz/nz-health-statistics/data-references/code-tables/common-code-tables/health-
speciality-code-table
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5.2.4 Mental Health Services
[Paul O’Neil and Minogue(2008)] provides a comprehensive overview of the history of New
Zealand mental health funding. Mental health funding systems in the mid-1990s were the
outcome of different Commissions of Inquiry. In 1996, the second Mason Inquiry established the
Mental Health Commission, which eventually developed and published an input-based funding
model known as The Blueprint for Mental health-services in New Zealand, or more briefly, The
Blueprint in 1998. Since then, mental health has always been input funded.
Only recently have mental health output measures been developed. The PRIMHD38 mental
health information collection system collects mental health, health service output measures.
The mental health information used in this thesis is one of the initial unpublished attempts
undertaken within the MoH to derive a DHB-level mental output series. Like any new statistic,
every effort was made to address data quality issues apparent in the data; however, a measure of
error undoubtedly exists.
PRIMHD mental health, health-service volume data was mapped to input-based mental
health Purchase Unit Codes (PUCs). DHB Production Plan information was used to estimate the
amount spent by DHBs delivering different PUC measures of mental health-services. Estimates
of the cost per PRIMHD volume were derived for each DHB, and the median cost across all
DHBs for each PRIMHD was used as a proxy for an output “costweight”, and used to weight
changes in PRIMHD volumes to create a mental health output quantity measure. The original
experimental series was not released under the Official Information Act request; however, a
summarised version of the final results was made available.
Mental health information for the 2013 financial year was unavailable. Information for
the 2012 financial year was substituted as a proxy for 2013 mental health output volumes.
No information is available to determine whether 2012 mental health volumes under-state or
over-state 2013’s mental health volumes.
38http://www.health.govt.nz/nz-health-statistics/national-collections-and-surveys/collections/primhd-mental-
health-datamega=Health statisticstitle=PRIMHD
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5.2.5 Health Service Cost Information
Health-service cost information was used to combine the individual health-services volume
measures for each MSG aggregate commodity:
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Non-inpatient health-service volumes were weighted together using the “National Price Book”
2013 prices. The “National Price Book” is derived from the joint DHBSS/MoH National Pricing
Programme (NPP). NPP collects health-service cost information from DHBs with activity-based
health-service costing systems to estimate the average cost of health service delivery for different
types of health services. The average costs are used by DHBs as transfer prices for allocating
funds between themselves whenever patients are treated outside their resident DHB catchment
area. The “National Price” is used to compensate the treating DHB for costs incurred by
the non-local patient. Prices in the 2013 financial year were chosen as the weighting for the
non-inpatient volumes because they represented the set of prices with the highest coverage of
non-inpatient activity for all of the purchase units volume measures obtained from the MoH.
5.2.6 Sub-Annual Volume Interpolation
The different data sources used within this thesis were all reconciled to a monthly time frequency.
The NMDS-derived inpatient volumes were supplied on a daily frequency and were aggregated
up to a monthly measure. Both the Statistics New Zealand price data and DHB Shared Service’s
Health Workforce Information Programme (HWIP) labour FTE information were supplied on a
quarterly frequency. A linear interpolation method was applied to allocate quarterly price and
FTE changes back to the months comprising the quarterly frequency.
The non-inpatient and mental health data was supplied on an annual basis. Deriving monthly
estimates required the annual volume estimates to be allocated back to monthly sub-periods
using some logical allocation process. Because the inpatient NMDS data was available on a
daily basis, its monthly pattern was used to derive proportions of total NMDS activity occurring
within each month of each financial year.
The monthly pattern of inpatient health-service delivery, derived from the NMDS data, was
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used to allocate the annual non-inpatient and mental health data back to months occurring
within each financial year. In the absence of any other information for the underlying seasonal
pattern occurring within the delivery of mental health or outpatient services, allocating annual
measures to months using NMDS ensures DHB Provider Arms retain at least some of the
seasonal variation observable from low time frequency data. The price data, used to estimate
the quantity of capital consumed in production, was measured on a quarterly frequency and
linearly interpolated back to a monthly frequency.
5.2.7 Year-to-Date and Missing Values
The MoH’s profit and loss monitoring information was provided as “year-to-date”, where each
month’s values reflect the cumulative totals for the months occurring within the financial period.
In order to relate changes in health service quantity to changes in input quantity to changes
in costs incurred, the year-to-date expense totals needed to be differenced to derive changes in
monthly expenses. Differencing the profit and loss information resulted in some unusual expense
movements which may have been omitted from the MoH error checking processes when only
cumulative year-to-date totals were being observed.
Some monthly observations for DHBs were missing. For example, Hutt DHB’s profit and
loss data for December 2012 was missing. Where one month observation was missing from a
series with observations on either side of the missing month, the missing month’s value was
interpolated as the average of the two monthly year to date values on either side, and differenced
to estimate the monthly spend for inputs used in production.
5.3 Labour
Labour inputs are measured as a base-weighted Laspeyres volume index, with the 2011 financial
year average labour costs for the different workforce groups used as base-weights.
Algebraically,
L(Labour) =
∑b
a=1w
0
aL
t
a∑b
a=1w
0
aL
0
a
(12)
Where: w0a is the base period average labour costs for the workforce labour group of a = 1, ., b
employed by DHBs. L0a,L
t
a are the workforce Full Time Equivalent (FTE) contracted-hour-based
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labour volume measures for workforce group a = 1, .., b.
The smaller and rural DHBs rely on outsourced labour for delivering health care. The ratio
of outsourced labour expense to employed labour expense is notably higher for the West Coast,
Wairarapa, Whanganui and South Canterbury DHBs (Figure 6). For these DHBs, outsourced
labour may reflect difficulty they face in recruiting workforce to permanent employment posi-
tions. I have chosen to treat outsourced labour payments and workforce as an intermediate
consumption good. The relationship between contracting DHB and contracted workforce is
governed by contract law, instead of employment law. Whether the contract between the DHB
and the contracted workforce inherit MECA-like terms and conditions is not directly observable.
Consequently, no attempt has been made within this thesis to impute outsource labour workforce
volumes and assign their additional value to DHB employed labour measures.
5.3.1 Ministry of Health FTE Monitoring Information
The MoH collects DHB workforce employment measures; however, the relationship between
the workforce sizes reported by DHBs and by the MoH has historically been poor (Figure (7)).
Figure (7), derived from the MoH’s FTE monitoring information, and DHBSS HWIP labour
data, presents the FTE workforce estimates from the two sources for common time periods and
workforce groups.
The two workforce data sources, if equal, ought to both be projected along the black 45
degree line included in Figure (7).
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Compared to what DHBs are reporting their workforces to be, MoH data consistently over-
estimates the sizes of the nursing, allied health and medical workforce groups, and under-estimates
the number of Management and Administration and support workers.
Part of the differences between the MoH and DHBSS workforce measures relates to definitional
and measurement differences between the two data sources. The MoH collects an “Accrued” FTE
measure.39 ‘Accrued hours’ measure staffing hours using accounting notions of cost. DHBs adjust
their staffing hour estimates for annual leave / time off / holidays as those leave entitlements
accrue, not when they are taken by the employee, meaning full-time employees count as more
than one Accrued FTE. Where payroll records do not align with monthly reporting periods,
[of Health(2005)] requires DHBs to accrue payroll hours to a monthly, quarterly, or annual
reporting period through inflating or deflating actual pay-period hours reported in any reporting
period to the actual number of weekday hours in the reporting period. The overall result of the
complex calculations for calculating an accrued FTE measure is to reduce the variability of the
labour input data supplied by DHBs into the MoH.
The complex process of inflating and deflating pay period hours to coincide with reporting
hours, as well as accrue leave when earnt rather than taken has a smoothing effect on the
MoH labour measures which was found to understate labour’s importance in the health-service
production process. When both health-service output volumes were compared to the MoH
FTE labour measures, the variation within the MoH FTE labour was significantly less than the
variation occurring within the delivery of health-services, resulting in the labour measure poorly
measuring labour inputs consumed in the health-service production process.
5.3.2 DHB Shared Services - Health Workforce Information Programme (HWIP)
DHBSS estimate and publish alternative labour measures from HWIP. HWIP collects DHB
Provider Arm labour market data for workforce forecasting and modelling purposes. Individual
employee level record data from DHB human resource information systems is collected by DHBSS.
HWIP collects both contracted hours and paid hour labour measures, with more certainty given
to the contracted hour measure. The unit record data sources enable HWIP to also estimate
workforce headcount labour measures.
HWIP collects workforce information by Australia and New Zealand Standard Occupational
39[of Health(2005)]
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Classification (ANZSCO), a skill-based classification developed by Statistics New Zealand and
the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Being skill-based, a close connection exists between HWIP’s
measures and the training requirements for different health-sector occupations.
HWIP’s data collection was not without its difficulties. In its initial phases, its “Quarterly
Reports” - its main publication - was put on hold for a period of time as DHBSS concentrated
on improving the data’s quality.40 The effect of data issues can be seen in the size and changes
within the “Unknown” workforce group in Figure 8: the difference between individual records
which can be allocated to workforce groups, and those that cannot, together with other sources
of error.
The high visibility of the workforce estimates published on DHBSS’s website41 together with
DHBs being both the source of the data and the “customer” of information have led to the
significant data quality improvements over time. For these reasons, HWIP labour information
has been used as the quantity measures within equation (12) above.
HWIP data was mapped to financial information derived from section 5.1.1 to estimate
average labour costs for each DHB and workforce group over time. Because both the HWIP labour
measures and the DHB Financial Monitoring information derive from separate independent data
sources, the logic of equation (10) ensures the resulting average labour cost measures are, in
effect, a Paasche index of labour “prices” for each workforce group. However, being derived from
two separate independent data sources implies that the resulting Paasche labour price measure
inherits all of the error occurring within both of the two independent data sources.
Figures (11), (13)-(17) at the end of this section describe each DHB’s aggregate workforce,
and their disaggregate workforce-specific labour costs.
40http://www.dhbsharedservices.health.nz/Site/Future Workforce/HWIP/DHB Base Data Reports.aspx
41http://www.dhbsharedservices.health.nz/Site/Future Workforce/HWIP/DHB Base Data Reports.aspx
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5.4 Capital
The DHB profit and loss statements reflect the value of payments made to employees / suppliers
/ lenders / owners for inputs used by DHBs in the production of health-services over a period of
time. Explicit payments contained within the profit and loss accounts, including the residual
surplus value (if any), reflect payments made to the economic factors-of-production for all the
inputs used in the production process.
In this thesis, payments to employee factors-of-production are “labour” costs. All other
payments, including the size of any surplus after other payments have been made are “capital”
costs. “Capital” is further split into three separate mutually-exclusive groups:
• Intermediate Consumption:
Intermediate consumption are goods and services purchased from other businesses which are
entirely consumed in the health-service production process. Within this thesis, outsourced
labour for the reasons described in section 5.3, is considered an intermediate consumption
service.
• Productive Capital Costs:
DHB profit and loss statements include depreciation that reflects the loss of economic
value through wear-and-tear and diminution of value of assets used in the production
process. In theory, “capital services” derived from the productive capital stock ought to
be productive capital inputs consumed in the production process, not the “depreciation”
component recognised in DHB profit and loss statements. Measuring the value of capital
services consumed in the production process that reflect the age-efficiency of the DHB’s
productive capital stock is difficult. Depreciation is the theoretically closest proxy.
• Financial and Equity Services:
Financially related interest payments and net profit/ surplus remaining after all other
expenses have been paid represent a return to either the lender or owners of financial/equity
services provided to the business. “Capital” in a financial sense of lending money to a
business either originates from third party lenders, like banks, or through parties taking
an equity stake within the business through ownership. Through either channel, interest
payments and claims on the residual value of economic production once all other claims
have been paid represent the returns to financial/equity services extended to the business.
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5.4.1 DHB Capital Inputs
For the year ending June 2013, DHBs collectively spent approximately $7,996 million on the
production of health-services through their Provider Arms on the following areas:
• Labour Costs $5,008 million
– Personnel Costs: $5,008 million
• Capital Costs $2,988 million
– (Intermediate Consumption) Clinical Supplies: $1,235 million
– (Intermediate Consumption) Infrastructure and Non-Clinical Supplies: $672 million
– (Intermediate Consumption) Outsourced Services: $490 million
– (Productive Capital Costs / Financial and Equity Services) Depreciation, Interest
and Return to Government (Capital Charge): $592 million
Labour payments account for approximately 63% of DHB Provider Arm expenditure implying
“capital”, the Clinical Supplies, Infrastructure, Outsourced services and use-costs described above,
account for the remaining 37% of expenditure in the production of health-services.
5.4.2 Estimating DHB Capital Input Quantity
Earlier DHB Monitoring schedules de-composed the Clinical, Infrastructure and Non-Clinical
supply costs into the following items:
• Clinical Supplies
– Treatment Disposables
– Diagnostic Supplies & Other Clinical Sups.
– Instruments & Equipment
– Patient Appliances
– Implants and Prostheses
– Pharmaceuticals
– Other Clinical & Client Costs
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• Infrastructure and Non-clinical
– Hotel Services, Laundry Cleaning
– Facilities
– Transport
– IT Systems & Telecommunications
– Interest & Financing Charges
– Professional Fees Expenses
– Other Operating Expenses
– Democracy
– Subsidiaries, Joint Ventures & Minority Interests
– Infrastructure and Non-clinical supplies
In later periods, the monitoring schedules removed the detail breakdowns of “Clinical
Supplies” and “Infrastructure and Non-clinical” costs. Having the earlier period detail allowed
the sub-components of the “Clinical Supplies” and “Infrastructure and Non-clinical” costs to be
measured and price-deflated. The proportion each sub-component contributed to its high-level
cost measure within the base year was used to weight the price deflator for later periods where
the sub-components detail was removed from the data.
A composite price deflator for the capital inputs into production was derived from the
proportion each sub-component contributed to the value of “Clinical Supplies” and “Infrastructure
and Non-clinical” costs in the base year and used to estimate the underlying quantity of capital
consumed in production across all the periods included within this thesis.
5.4.3 Price Deflators
A combination of Statistics New Zealand’s Capital Goods Price Index (CGPI), its Producer
Price Index (PPI) output index and Reserve Bank of New Zealand information was used to
estimate the underlying quantity of capital inputs used in the production of health care.
Unless the price deflators are well aligned to the quantity measures within the nominal values
being deflated, price deflation is not the preferred method for estimating change in underlying
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quantity measures. The preferred method for estimating quantity change is through the direct
estimation of a quantity index. In the absence of information to direct measure change in
capital input quantities, price deflation is a method of last resort; however, the derived quantity
measures inherit all the issues associated with the price measure, including any issues with its
overall ’fit’ to the commodities being deflated.
Table (4) describes the price deflators used in this analysis to derive the underlying quantity
of capital inputs used by DHBs in the production of health-services. Statistics New Zealand’s
price indices are quarterly measures. Monthly estimates of the price indices were derived through
linear interpolation for the interceding months of each quarter. The Reserve Bank statistics
were already published with a monthly time frequency, allowing their direct application to the
monthly DHB data.
DHB.Cost.Component SNZ.Price.Index Specific.Price.Index.Used
FACILITIES CGPI High Level All Groups
DEPRECIATION EXPENSE CGPI High Level All Groups
INSTRUMENTS & EQUIPMENT CGPI PME Medical and surgical equipment and orthopedic appliances
PATIENT APPLIANCES CGPI PME Medical and surgical equipment and orthopedic appliances
IMPLANTS AND PROSTHESES CGPI PME Medical and surgical equipment and orthopedic appliances
OTHER CLINICAL & CLIENT COSTS PPI High Level Professional Scientific Technical Administrative and Support Services
INFRASTRUCTURE & NON-CLINICAL SUPPLIES PPI High Level All Industries
DIAGNOSTIC SUPPLIES & OTHER CLINICAL SUPS. PPI High Level Manufacturing
OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES PPI High Level All Industries
CLINICAL SUPPLIES PPI Outputs Basic Chemical and Chemical Product Manufacturing
TREATMENT DISPOSABLES PPI Outputs Basic Chemical and Chemical Product Manufacturing
PHARMACEUTICALS PPI Outputs Basic Chemical and Chemical Product Manufacturing
HOTEL SERVICES, LAUNDRY & CLEANING PPI Outputs Other Store Based Retailing and Non Store Retailing
TRANSPORT PPI Outputs Road Transport
IT SYSTEMS & TELECOMMUNICATIONS PPI Outputs Telecommunications Internet and Library Services
PROFESSIONAL FEES & EXPENSES PPI Outputs Professional Scientific and Technical Services
OUTSOURCED SERVICES PPI Outputs Professional Scientific and Technical Services
CAPITAL CHARGE Reserve Bank Business Lending Rate (B3 Interest rates on lending and deposits (% pa)
INTEREST COSTS CHFA Reserve Bank Business Lending Rate (B3 Interest rates on lending and deposits (% pa)
INTEREST COSTS PRIVATE Reserve Bank Business Lending Rate (B3 Interest rates on lending and deposits (% pa)
Table 4: Prices Indicies Use to Deflate Capital Input Costs
Figure (9) graphs both the nominal and constant-price quantity values for intermediate
consumption and capital services. The cumulative effect of price deflation has made little
difference to the two measures, suggesting that over the relatively short time-horizon for these
statistics, price changes have not had a significant effect on DHB capital costs.
Figure (12) at the end of this section presents the aggregate capital inputs for each DHB.
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6 Production Economic Theory
Economic production theory starts with a simplified model of production: production is the
economic process of transforming goods and service input quantities into goods or service output
quantities of another kind. The transformation process is stylistically modelled using a production
function, typically:42
Y = F [L,K] (13)
where:
Y = a quantity measure of economic output produced within a specific time period,
L = a quantity measure of labour used in the production of Y,
K = a quantity measure of physical capital used in the production of Y.
All of the variables entering equation (13) are quantity flow measures: for a given time
period, specific quantities of L and K were completely consumed through the transformation
described by the production function, into the quantity of output described by variable Y.
The generic production function described in equation (13) is assumed to be continuous and
at least twice differentiable, with the marginal products of its inputs positive but decreasing,
thus:
∂Y
∂L
= FL,
∂2Y
∂L2
= FLL,
∂Y
∂K
= FK ,
∂2Y
∂K2
= FKK (14)
where: FL > 0;FK > 0;FLL < 0;FKK < 0
How output changes according to changes in input quantities reflects the production function’s
homogeneity, a property with important economic implications. Adopting [Bairam(1994)]’s
terminology:
(hL, hK) = F [hL, hK] = hγf(L,K) = hγY (15)
The variable γ > 1 in equation (15) reflects output increasing more than proportionally to a
given change in the inputs to the production process, and production is described as reflecting
increasing returns-to-scale. Where γ < 1, output increases less than proportionally in the
production process, and production is described as exhibiting decreasing returns-to-scale. Where
γ = 1, outputs increase proportionally to a change in the inputs consumed in the production
42[Bairam(1994)]
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process, and production is described as exhibiting constant returns-to-scale, and the production
function (15) is homothetic.
[Bairam(1994)] outlines four properties associated with the generic production function
described in equation (15), which have empirical implications for estimating New Zealand’s
health-service production process:
• The Elasticity of Scale
The elasticity of scale, ε, is equivalent to γ and, for homogeneous production functions,
is constant for all levels of production activity. Importantly, ε is the sum of the partial
output elasticities with respect to each input, or:
ε =
∑
εi =
∑[ ∂Y
∂Xi
/
Xi
Y
]
(16)
The ∂Y∂Xi component of (16) is the marginal product of input Xi, while
Xi
Y is the inverse
of the average product with respect to input Xi. For a production function to exhibit
decreasing returns-to-scale, all marginal input products need to be less than their average
product: the increase in production of the next ith unit of input must be less than the
average increase from all preceding inputs consumed in the production process.
• Economic Returns to the Factors-of-Production
A homothetic production function, with inputs purchased from competitive markets implies:
∂Y
∂L
L+
∂Y
∂K
K = γY (17)
From equation (17), the entire value of the output, γY , is allocated back to the production
inputs according to their production-determined marginal productivities, ∂Y∂L and
∂Y
∂K . The
first order conditions of cost-minimisation require ∂Y∂L = W and
∂Y
∂K = r, where W and r
are “the” labour price, and “the” capital price rates.
From a homothetic function, the entire value of output is returned to the factors-of-
production in proportion to the input marginal productivities from the production function,
and their existing input quantities. The situation changes when either increasing or
decreasing returns-to-scale are the prevailing production conditions. Under increasing
returns-to-scale, the left hand side of equation (17) is greater than the value on the right
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and “excess” returns result.
• The Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution
In the simplified two input model of production defined in equation (13), the marginal
rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between the inputs is:
∆Y = ∂Y∂L dL+
∂Y
∂K dK = 0
dL
dK = −∂Y/∂K∂Y/∂L
(18)
which reflects how one input to the production process needs to change when another
input is changed to ensure output remains at the same level.
When the number of inputs consumed in the production process expands beyond two, the
MRTS becomes more difficult to interpret:
∆Y = ∂Y∂L dL+
∂Y
∂K dK +
∂Y
∂X dX = 0
dK
dL = − ∂Y/∂L∂Y/∂K −
[
∂Y/∂X
∂Y/∂K
]
dX
dL
(19)
Equation (19) describes the MRTS of two of three inputs, K and X, consumed in an
arbitrary production process to a change in the third input, L. Without the effect of the
third variable, X, the MRTS is equivalent to equation (18).
The effect of the third variable creates another “channel” through which the input ad-
justment process may operate. Depending on the relative magnitudes of the marginal
products of the inputs within equation (19):
dK
dL
= 0 if
∂Y/∂L
∂Y/∂K
= −
[
∂Y/∂X
∂Y/∂K
]
dX
dL
(20)
Only if the inputs are strongly separable such that dXdL = 0 does equation (19) reduce to
equation (18). If the more likely assumption of dXdL 6= 0 holds, then how much each input
needs to changes in order to maintain output when one input is reduced is a complex
interaction between input marginal productivities and changes in other inputs which are
induced by the initial change itself.
If inputs X and L are complement inputs in the production process, then dXdL > 0 and the
capital adjustments in equation (19) needed to maintain output are consequently larger.
Alternatively, if inputs X and L are substitutes, then dXdL < 0 and induced changes in X
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will offset the change in capital needed to maintain output.
In a health production sense, inputs to the production process may be labour, capital, and
outsourced services. In the event of a labour strike, which reduces L available for use in
the production process, the ability of a DHB to maintain its health-service throughput
may depend on whether outsourced services are complements or substitutes for labour.
If outsourced services consist of locum doctors - a labour substitute - then the economic
impact of a labour strike may be partially offset by increasing locum-provided care. If
outsourced services is a contracted laboratory capability closely engaging with the workforce
currently on strike, and an input complement to labour, then a loss of labour induces a loss
in diagnostic services, exacerbating the adjustment process of capital needed to maintain
health-service throughput volumes.
• The Elasticity of Substitution
Closely tied to the concept of the MRTS, the elasticity of substitution (σ) measures the
relative “ease” that one input to the production process may be substituted for another.
Definitionally, in the simplified two input case:
σ =
dlog(K/L)
dlog(MRTS)
(21)
[Bairam(1994)] identifies σ as one of the most powerful indexes of the properties of
the production function since, under certain circumstances σ uniquely determines the
production function’s form.43 The main difference between the MRTS and σ is that σ
reflects the ability to substitute inputs for each other at a specific level of input scale,
reflected by dlog(K/L). However, as the number of inputs expands beyond two, σ inherits
the complexity of interaction which affects the calculation of the MRTS.
6.1 Modelling DHB Provider Arm Health Service Production
6.1.1 Cobb-Douglas Production (CD)
Cobb-Douglas (CD) is the simplest functional model of an economic production process, and
has the form:
43[Bairam(1994)] at page 11.
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Y = γ
(
KαLβ
)
(22)
where:
Y = a quantity measure of economic output produced within a specific time period,
L = a quantity measure of labour used in the production of Y,
K = a quantity measure of physical capital used in the production of Y,
α = the relative capital factor intensity,
β = the relative labour factor intensity,
γ = Hicksian-neutral technological growth,
The elasticity of scale, ε, is well-defined as:
ε = α+ β (23)
CD is a popular applied production function since the logarithmic transformation of equation
(22) generates an easily estimatable linear function of the inputs into the production process:
log(Y ) = log(γ) + αlog(K) + βlog(L) (24)
CD technology is extensible to include multiple inputs into the production process, making it
a popular first-estimated production technology for most applied work; however, when extended
to include multiple inputs, CD’s well know limitation is that it specifies a unitary elasticity of
substitution across all inputs which implies all inputs can easily be replaced with each other:
σ =
dln (K/L)
dln(MRS)
= 1 (25)
6.1.2 Constant Elasticity of Substitution Production (CES)
In a two productive input model of economic production, with the assumption of homothetic
technology, the basic constant elasticity production (CES) function is denoted by:
Y = A
[
δL−ρ + (1− δ)K−ρ]−γ/ρ (26)
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where:
Y = a quantity measure of economic output produced within a specific time period,
L = a quantity measure of labour used in the production of Y,
K = a quantity measure of physical capital used in the production of Y,
δ = the relative labour factor intensity used in the production,
A = Hicksian-neutral technological growth,
γ = returns-to-scale factor. Under the assumption of homothetcity, γ is equal to 1.
To derive the marginal products of the inputs into the production process, let:
ψ =
[
δL−ρ + (1− δ)K−ρ] (27)
Combining equation (27) with equation (26) simplifies equation (26) to become:
Y = Aψ−1/ρ (28)
Deriving the elasticity of substitution (σ) proceeds from equation (28) through taking the
marginal products of the production function. Focusing initially on labour then, through the
Chain Rule:
∂Y
∂L
=
−A
ρ
(
ψ
−
(
1
ρ
)
−1
)
∂ψ(L)
∂L
(29)
where,
∂ψ(L)
∂L
= −δρL−ρ−1 (30)
making equation (29) become:
∂Y
∂L
=
−A
ρ
(
ψ
−
(
1
ρ
)
−1
)(−δρL−ρ−1) (31)
Removing variables which cancel out, equation (31) further reduces to:
∂Y
∂L
= Aδ
(
ψ
−
(
1+ρ
ρ
))
L−(1+ρ) (32)
Substituting equation (27) back into equation (32) produces for the partial derivative of
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labour:
∂Y
∂L
= Aδ
([
δL−ρ + (1− δ)K−ρ])−( 1+ρρ ) L−(1+ρ) (33)
Through symmetry of the production function in its inputs in equation (26), the marginal
product of capital is likewise defined as:
∂Y
∂K
= A (1− δ) ([δL−ρ + (1− δ)K−ρ])−( 1+ρρ )K−(1+ρ) (34)
The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between capital and labour - a measure of the
concavity of the production function at a given level of output - is defined as:
MRS =
∂Y/∂L
∂Y/∂K
(35)
Substituting equation (33) and equation (34) into equation (35) produces:
MRS =
Aδ ([δL−ρ + (1− δ)K−ρ])−
(
1+ρ
ρ
)
L−(1+ρ)
A (1− δ) ([δL−ρ + (1− δ)K−ρ])−
(
1+ρ
ρ
)
K−(1+ρ)
(36)
Which, simplifies into:
MRS =
δL−(1+ρ)
(1− δ)K−(1+ρ) (37)
and
MRS =
δ
(1− δ)
(
L
K
)−(1+ρ)
(38)
finally:
MRS =
δ
(1− δ)
(
K
L
)(1+ρ)
(39)
The Elasticity of Substitution, σ, is a measure of the relative “ease” with which one input
can be substituted for another for a given ratio of capital and labour inputs employed in the
production process.
In theory, σ is a relative substitution measure: its magnitude is dependent on the existing
relative size of the inputs actually currently used in the production process, together with the
MRS reflecting the production function’s concavity with respect to the existing level of economic
production. The “constant”ness of the elasticity of substitution for the CES production function
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is a restriction imposed on the CES functional form which makes σ independent of the current
factor input ratios. Consequently, as the ratio of capital to labour changes, the value of σ is
constant throughout.
σ is defined as:
σ =
dln (K/L)
dln(MRS)
(40)
From equation (39), taking the natural logs of both sides of equation (39) gives:
ln(MRS) = ln
(
δ
(1− δ)
)
+ (1 + ρ)ln
(
K
L
)
(41)
which, when differentiating ln(MRS) with respect to (K/L), gives:
dln(MRS)
dln (K/L)
= 1 + ρ (42)
or
σ =
dln (K/L)
dln(MRS)
=
1
1 + ρ
(43)
Using the results from equation (43) and equation (26), equation 1 in [Klump et al.(2012)Klump, McAdam, and Willman]
can be derived.
From σ = 11+ρ , then
1 + ρ =
1
σ
⇒ ρ = 1
σ
− 1 = 1
σ
− σ
σ
=
1− σ
σ
(44)
and
−ρ = −
[
1− σ
σ
]
=
σ − 1
σ
(45)
Replacing −ρ in equation (26) with equation (45) and setting γ = 1 gives:
Y = A
[
δL
σ−1
σ + (1− δ)K σ−1σ
] σ
σ−1
(46)
replicating [Klump et al.(2012)Klump, McAdam, and Willman] equation 1.
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6.1.3 Box-Cox Production Function (BC)
[Bairam(1994)] describes a modification of the Cobb-Douglas / CES production function that
employs a Box-Cox transformation on its input and output variables.
Y λ − 1
λ
= A(t) + α
(
Lλ − 1
λ
)
+ β
(
Kλ − 1
λ
)
(47)
Bairam’s Box-Cox transformation has the advantage of encapsulating both Cobb-Douglas and
CES technology within its parameters when λ = 0 or λ < 1 respectively. When λ = 1, equation
(62) is a linear function of the inputs into production.
The marginal input productivities for equation (62) are given by:
fL = α(
L
Q
)λ−1 (48)
and
fK = β(
K
Q
)λ−1 (49)
[Hsing(1996)], expanding on the properties of equation (62), also noted the output elasticities
with respect to the inputs are:
EQL = α(
L
Q
)λ (50)
and
EQK = β(
K
Q
)λ (51)
The non-homogeneous elasticity of scale for equation (62) is:
ε = α(
L
Q
)λ−1 + β(
K
Q
)λ−1 (52)
Finally, the elasticity of substitution, σ, is:
σ = 1/(1− λ) (53)
[Bairam(1994)] Box-Cox (BC) production function has not been without its critics. [Grimes(1991)]
argues the BC production function fails to satisfy non-classical production function properties
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since under general conditions, equation (62) implies output can be generated without capital or
labour inputs used in the production process.
Respecifying the BC production function, [Grimes(1991)] shows equation (62) is equivalent
to:
Y = γ
{
µ+ δLλ + (1− δ)Kλ
} 1
λ
(54)
where γ = (α+ β)
1
λ (55)
δ =
α
(α+ β)
(56)
µ =
(Aλ+ 1− α− β)
(α+ β)
(57)
If µ 6= 0, then at the point K = L = 0 equation (54) reduces to:
Y = γ {Aλ+ 1} 1λ 6= 0 (58)
implying non-zero (even negative) output results from the effects of Hicksian-neutral technological
growth only.
Despite [Grimes(1991)] zero-input special criticism, the BC production function has received
attention within the applied literature with favourable results. [Hsing(1996)], exploring regional
manufacturing production functions for the different states within the United States of America,
found the BC production function performed best between choices of the CD, CES, a translog
production function, a generalised Leontief function and equation (62). Equation (62) produced
the best applied results, with a plausible elasticity of substitution and total output elasticities.
[Hsing(1996)] found the output elasticities of capital and labour across different states, with
decreasing / constant / increasing returns-to-scale for manufacturing production occurring in
different states. The states with increasing returns-to-scale also had the highest level of capital
deepening; however, with only a low correlation between capital/labour ratios and returns-to-
scale, other factors were affecting the efficiency of manufacturing in some states. The same
author, in an earlier work,44 found similar superior performance of equation (62) when exploring
state-level aggregated industry manufacturing production.
44[Hsing(1993)]
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6.2 Estimating Production in a System-of-Equations
Recent empirical production analysis, reflecting both advances in statistical computing and
non-linear optimisation techniques, has focused on estimating empirical production functions
within a system-of-equation context.
[Klump et al.(2012)Klump, McAdam, and Willman], focusing on the concept of “normalis-
ing” a CES production function when estimating it from time-series data, described the specifica-
tion of an estimatable system-of-equations, defined by the production function and the first order
conditions of profit maximisation. Equations 34 - 36 in [Klump et al.(2012)Klump, McAdam, and Willman]’s
paper45 specified the system-of-equations in normalised form that, when applied to this thesis,
looks like:
Health Sector Production: Yti = A
[
δL−ρti + (1− δ)K−ρti
]−1/ρ
Labour Market Clearing: ∂Y∂L = wti = Aδ
([
δL−ρti + (1− δ)K−ρti
])−( 1+ρ
ρ
)
L
−(1+ρ)
ti
Capital Market Clearing: ∂Y∂K = rti = A (1− δ)
([
δL−ρti + (1− δ)K−ρti
])−( 1+ρ
ρ
)
K
−(1+ρ)
ti
(59)
where i = individual DHB.
The equations within the system-of-equations in (59) are non-linear: ρ enters the modelling
as a power function of the inputs individually and in a transformed power function of the
production and the first order conditions associated with the input factor markets. Estimating
equation (59)’s system-of-equations, where a two input CES production function is simultaneously
estimated with production’s marginal input factor productivities as the input demand functions
for input factor markets, is the main focus of this thesis.
While advances in computer-based optimisation processes have allowed once un-estimable
non-linear functions to be empirically estimated, the non-linear nature of the optimisation
processes makes estimating the system-of-equations (59) extremely sensitive to the initiating
values needed for the optimisation processes. If optimisation does occur, the results are not yet
always reliable due to convergence difficulties.46
45[Klump et al.(2012)Klump, McAdam, and Willman] on page 788
46[ SysFit?]
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6.2.1 A Cobb-Douglas System-of-Equations
In case the CES system-of-equations fails to converge to a solution, a linearised Cobb-Douglas
variant of equations (59) will also be estimated. A linearised system will ensure an estimatable
solution results.
Health Sector Production: log(Yti) = log(Ati) + αlog(Lti) + βlog(Kti)
Labour Market: ∂Y∂L = log(wti) = log(Atiα) + (α− 1)log(Lti) + βlog(Kti)
Capital Market: ∂Y∂K = log(rti) = log(Atiβ) + (α)log(Lti) + (β − 1)log(Kti)
(60)
The data sources within this thesis include a rich specification of labour inputs used in the
production process. Equation (60) system-of-equations, in Cobb-Douglas form, allows for the
extension of the input variables beyond two input factors-of-production.
The “cost” of the increased flexibility of adopting an expanded Cobb-Douglas production
functional form is Cobb-Douglas well-known unity elasticity of substitution: all input factors are
equally substitutable for each other in the production process. Also, since the underlying “true”
production process is unknown, estimated results may suffer from misspecification bias. There’s
benefits and costs either way, which makes empirical analysis the final determinant of the merits
of an expanded Cobb-Douglas functional approach.
6.2.2 Interpreting the System-of-Equations
Within the labour market system-of-equations in either (59) or (60), DHB demand for labour is
determined by labour’s marginal productivity derived from the DHB Provider Arm production
function. Similarly, DHB capital demands reflect DHB marginal rates of capital productivity.
DHBs employ labour, expanding the labour input in both the production function and its
marginal rate of labour productivity, until the marginal revenue product (the value contributed
to total production by the last employed worker) is equal to the price of the last employed worker
purchased from the labour market. Similarly for capital: firms invest in and expand the volume
of capital employed in production, up until the value of the contribution of the last quantity of
capital to production equals capital’s market price.
The labour market and capital market equations in the system-of-equations define a rela-
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tionship that exists between the market price of an input used in production, and the value it
individually adds to output. In the labour market equation, so long as ∂log(Wti)∂log(Kti) > 0 and α < 1,
then ∂log(Wti)∂log(Lti) < 0 and DHB marginal revenue product is declining with increasing quantities of
labour employed in production, but increasing if more capital is used in the production process.
As more labour becomes employed, the declining marginal productivity suggests the labour-
market determined labour costs should fall. As DHBs increase the volume of capital employed
in production, the demand for labour increases due to higher scales of production increasing the
marginal productivity of labour feeding through into the labour market and leading to higher
wages.
6.2.3 MECA Union Effects in the Price/Quantity Adjustment Process
The only requirement for cost minimisation is that the market equations in (60) hold. The
labour and production markets can interact bi-directionally: production fundamentals might
alter labour prices, or labour prices might alter production fundamentals. If the labour market
is non-competitive, and unions can exploit the lack of competition to set labour prices, then
DHB production-based marginal productivities need to adjust to changing labour prices in the
labour market. Adjustment occurs through altering the quantities of inputs used in production,
until balance is once again achieved between labour prices and input marginal productivities.
If the unions’ monopoly face can increase wages, then from equation (60), either the quantity
of labour needs to reduce to rebalance the two markets, or the volume of capital needs to increase
to make labour’s marginal revenue product again equal the higher labour-market-set labour
price. Any middle ground, involving less labour and more capital, is also feasible to rebalance
the markets, with the adjustment to labour and capital reflecting the ratio of the labour and
capital production coefficients α and β.
When balance between the marginal input products and the input market costs is achieved,
the effect of different quantities of capital and labour employed in production because of the
rebalancing is the loss of allocative efficiency described in section 3.5.1.
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7 Exploratory Regression Analysis
Sharing both monthly time-series and cross-sectoral DHB characteristics, this thesis uses panel
data as the basis for its econometric analysis. Panel data analytical issues include potential
hetroscedasticity across the DHB dimension, and auto-correlated errors across the time dimension.
Naive CD, CES and BC production models are used to explore DHB production processes.
When the system-of-equation regressions are estimated, more detailed analysis is included to
explore hetroscedasticity and auto-correlation issues.
All analysis in this thesis (indeed, the thesis itself) has been undertaken and written using
the R statistical language.47 R is a sophisticated statistical modelling language with built-in
capability for modelling and testing relationships across panel datasets, either through its “Linear
models for Panel Data” library48, or through its “Linear and Non-linear Mixed Effects Models”49
package, which allows the user to test for and model the separate time-series and cross-sectional
components.
7.1 Single Equation Cobb-Douglas Health-Service Production
Table (6) starts off with a very simple two input linearised Cobb-Douglas model as defined
in equation (22) (“Two Inputs”), together with a variation which includes a “Tertiary” DHB
dummy variable (“Two-Tertiary”). Table (6) also reports two more sophisticated single equation
production functions that include the multiple labour measures (“Multiple”), and the multiple
labour measures with a tertiary provider split (“Multiple-Tertiary”).
The “Tertiary” dummy allows different DHBs to suffer from diseconomies of scale related to
their size,50 recognising DHB scale-of-production cost difference has long been a feature of New
Zealand’s health funding environment.51
The “Tertiary” dummy variable identifies the following DHBs as “Tertiary”: Auckland DHB,
Canterbury DHB, Capital & Coast DHB, Counties Manukau DHB, Waikato DHB, Southern
DHB, and Waitemata DHB.
47http://www.r-project.org/
48http://cran.stat.auckland.ac.nz/web/packages/plm/index.html
49http://cran.stat.auckland.ac.nz/web/packages/nlme/index.html
50See Figure(10)
51http://www.adhb.govt.nz/news/Events/Tertiary%20Services%20Conference/2011/Presentations/7 Ajit conf 28 1111 Paul Howard.pdf
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7.1.1 Single Equation Cobb-Douglas Regression Results
With a labour input factor intensity coefficient of 0.63, and a total elasticity of scale estimate
of 0.970, Model 1 in Table (6) describes labour as the input contributing most to DHB health-
service production, a process which displays constant returns-to-scale. The model is statistically
significant and, with an R2 value of 0.965, a simple two input Cobb-Douglas model explains a
very high proportion of the variation in output.
Model 2 in Table (6) expands Model 1 through separating out tertiary from secondary
health-service providers. The tertiary split has generated significant differences in both the input
factor intensity and the elasticity of scale between secondary and tertiary providers. Adding an
additional unit of capital to secondary providers generates almost 35%52 more output than adding
an additional unit of labour. In contrast, for “capital rich” tertiary providers, an additional unit
of labour would generate more than 315% as much output as an additional unit of capital.53
Secondary care providers, with an elasticity of scale (σ) of 0.979, show constant returns-to-
scale. In contrast, σ = 0.805 for tertiary providers, indicating tertiaries suffer from decreasing
returns-to-scale.
7.1.2 Single Equation Cobb-Douglas: Multiple Inputs with Tertiariness
Models 3 and 4 in Table (6) extend the CD production model through expanding the number
of labour inputs used in production (Model 3), and modelling “tertiariness” (Model 4). Model
3’s capital coefficient remains similar to Model 1; however, the sum of the labour coefficients
decreases54, and Model 3 as a whole is characterised by decreasing returns-to-scale.55
Model 3 Labour
The Medical workforce has the highest marginal contribution to output (0.601), followed by
nursing (0.256), and support labour (0.111). From Model 3, Allied health workers have no
statistical impact on health-service production while Management / Administration labour has
a negative production function coefficient, close in magnitude to the positive medical coefficient.
From Model 3, each additional FTE unit of Management / Administration labour employed
520.562 / 0.417 = 1.35 more output
53Model 2’s tertiary provider labour and capital coefficients are 0.194 and 0.611 respectively
54Model 1: Labour = 0.629, compared to
∑5
i=1 (Li) = 0.451 in Model 3
55Model 1: σ = 0.97 compared to Model 3: σ = 0.83
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in the health-service production process decreases health-service output, more than twice as
much as each additional FTE unit of nursing labour increases health-service production. One
additional manager offset the positive production effects of two additional employed nurses. This
quite amusing result, that Management / Administration personnel negatively affect production,
is explored further when labour is estimated within a system-of-equations.
Model 4 Labour
Model 4 continues Model 2’s analysis of secondary / tertiaries factor intensities.56
Within secondary providers, the medical workforce makes the strongest contribution to
health-service production. Each additional medical worker contributes approximately 230% more
output as an additional nursing worker57, suggesting secondary providers might be “medical
workforce poor” and relatively “nursing workforce rich”.
The elasticity of scale, σ = 0.83, suggests decreasing returns-to-scale for secondary care
providers is now apparent, while tertiary provider scale diseconomies, at σ = 0.556, worsen. The
size of the tertiary nursing and support workforce production coefficients suggests “too many”
support and nursing workforces are employed within Tertiary providers for Tertiary provider’s
scale of production.58
From Model 4, increasing the medical workforce would make the highest contribution to
increases in both secondary and tertiary health service output.
Model 4 continues Model 3’s surprising management / administration workforce story: in
both secondary and tertiary providers, management / administration staff decrease health-service
production.59
56
Model 2 Secondary Provider: Capital = 0.562, Labour = 0.417
Model 4 Secondary Provider: Capital = 0.526,
∑5
i=1 (Li) = 0.304
Model 2 Tertiary Provider: Capital = 0.195, Labour = 0.611
Model 4 Tertiary Provider: Capital = 0.163,
∑5
i=1 (Li) = 0.403
57Nursing = 0.259, medical = 0.596, so 0.596 / 0.259 = 2.30 more per unit output from an additional medical
labour compared to additional nursing labour
58Tertiary nursing coefficient equals -0.033, support workforce equals -0.025
59Secondary care provider Management and Admin equals -0.673, while tertiary provider Management and
Admin equals -0.127.
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7.2 Single Equation Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
The R statistical language incorporates functionality to estimate single equation Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production functions using a variety of estimation methods.
The minEconCES library60 estimates the following CES functional form:
Y = γ
(
δK−ρ + (1− δ)L−ρ)−ν/ρ (61)
where:
Y = a quantity measure of economic output produced within a specific time period,
L = a quantity measure of labour used in the production of Y,
K = a quantity measure of physical capital used in the production of Y,
δ = the relative labour factor intensity used in the production,
γ = Hicksian-neutral technological growth,
ν = returns-to-scale factor. Under the assumption of homotheticity, ν is equal to 1, but within
micEconCES, the value of ν is free to vary.
σ = 1/(1 + ρ)
7.2.1 micEconCES Optimisation Methods
[Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)] outline the properties of the different estimation algorithms:
• Levenberg-Marquardt (LM)
The LM is an iterative algorithm which performs an optimal interpolation between a first-
order Taylor series approximation (Gauss-Newton method) and a steepest-descend method
(gradient method).61 Unlike other optimisation methods, LM estimates a local optimal
solution for the CES parameters. Researchers have found the LM outperforms other
optimisation methods for estimating CES parameters based on Monte-Carlo simulation
experiments. [Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)] note the LM algorithm performs as
poorly as the other methods in estimating the elasticity of substitution, which means that
the estimated elasticity tends to be biased towards infinity, unity, or zero.62
60[Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)]
61[Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)] at page 9
62[Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)] at page 10
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• Conjugate Gradients (CG)
Like LM, CG is an iterative algorithm but works best for objective functions that are
approximately quadratic. CG is sensitive to objective functions that are not well-behaved
or have a non-positive semi-definite Hessian. [Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)] note
that since the CES function has only few parameters and the objective function is not
approximately quadratic around the minimum, the CG method is probably less suitable
than other algorithms for estimating a CES function.
• Newton
The Newton method employed within micEconCES is based on a variation of the traditional
Newton iterative optimisation method. The Newton method tests the first and second
derivatives of the objective function to determine the direction of a shift vector representing
the next optimal estimate and iteratives between the first and second derivative estimates
until a stationary point is found when the objective function’s second derivatives are almost
zero. The Newton method estimates local maximum/minimum optimal values.
• Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS)
The BFGS algorithm is a variation of the Newton approach; however, uses a special
procedure to approximate and update the Hessian matrix of the objective function in
every iteration. [Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)] note that BFGS may not converge in
estimation if the current parameters are close, but not sufficiently close to the minimum.
If the current parameters are near the minimum, the Hessian may not be close enough
to achieve convergence. However, [Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)] also note that in
practice when BFGS does converge, its estimates are robust and “super-linear”.
• Nelder-Mead (NM)
Unlike the above algorithms, the NM method is designed to find a global maximum/minimum
of an objective function. The NM uses a “downhill simplex algorithm”, which makes NM
more tolerant to objective functions which are not well-behaved at the cost of a slower estima-
tion speed. The advantage of the NM algorithm is its robustness: the algorithm will almost
always converge, producing CES parameters; however, [Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)]
note that as a result of its heuristic optimisation technique, NM results should be handled
with care.63
63[Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)] at page 17
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• Simulated Annealing (SA)
[Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)] describe the SA algorithm as a robust global optimiser
that can be applied to a large search space and provides fast and reliable solutions. SA
chooses a random solution close to the current solution, while the probability of the choice
is driven by a global parameter which decreases as the algorithm progresses.
• Differential Evolution (DE)
The DE algorithm belongs to an ’evolutionary’ class of algorithms whose solution cannot
be proven analytically. For some problems, DE has proven to be more accurate and more
efficient than Simulated Annealing, Quasi-Newton, or other genetic algorithms described
above.64 [Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)] note the algorithm has proven to be effective
and accurate on a large range of optimisation problems.
• Byrd, Lu, Nocedal, and Zhu (L-BFGS-B)
The L-BFGS-B optimisation method is a variation of the BFGS method described above,
however, L-BFGS-B allows for constraints on the optimisation parameters. The L-BFGS-B
algorithm is well suited for high dimensional optimisation problems, and copes well with
the CES low dimensionality.
• PORT routines
The PORT routines are a variation on Newton’s optimisation method, allowing users to
specify constraints on the parameter space within which optimisation occurs.
• Kmenta approximation
The Kmenta approximation method is a linearised first order Taylor’s Expansion of the non-
linear CES function which is estimated using ordinary least squares. micEconCES estimates
the first order component of the Taylor’s Expansion only. The remaining unestimated
orders therefore bias the resulting regression through acting as omitted variables.
7.2.2 Two input CES
The following table of results was derived through estimating equation (61) as a single CES
production function using the methods described in subsection 7.2.1 above.
64[Henningsen and Henningsen(2011)] at page 21
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Method Gamma Delta Rho Nu Elasticity
BFGS 9.828 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
Conjugate Gradients 4.455 0.398 0.298 1.015 0.77
95% CI 3.518 - 5.392 0.174 - 0.622 -0.245 - 0.841 0.994 - 1.036
Kmenta 8.01 0.119 -1.312 0.968
95% CI 5.65 - 10.369 -0.206 - 0.443 -6.216 - 3.591 0.952 - 0.985
L-BFGS-B 9.827 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
Levenberg-Marquardt 9.828 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
Nelder-Mead 8.873 0.136 -0.511 0.962 2.046
95% CI 7.369 - 10.377 0.02 - 0.252 -1.064 - 0.041 0.943 - 0.981
Newton 9.828 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
PORT 9.828 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
Simulated Annealing 5.01 0.473 0.536 0.997 0.651
95% CI 3.941 - 6.079 0.23 - 0.716 -0.039 - 1.111 0.976 - 1.017
With the exception of the CG and the SA algorithms, ν < 1 with a 95% confidence interval
for all of two input CES functions, indicating production suffers from decreasing returns-to-scale.
The value of δ, the capital factor intensity, in most instances is approximately 0.14, suggesting
the labour factor intensity is approximately 0.86 and health-service production is a labour
intensive production process. Compared to the CD production processes of Model 1 in Table
(6), labour has increased in its factor intensity, with capital playing a less important production
role. Again, with the exception of CG and SA algorithms, ρ < 1 resulting in σ > 1 for almost all
variations of the two input CES function, suggesting capital and labour are highly substitutable
for each other in the production process.
Both the CG and SA algorithms suggest capital plays a more important role in production
than the other CES algorithms, and that the inputs into health-service production are not high
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substitutes for each other. In contrast to the other CES algorithms, labour’s factor intensity
within the CG CES model is approximately 0.60, with capital being 0.4, similar in size to the
Model 1’s results in Table (6). The SA algorithm suggests production is more balanced still,
with capital’s factor intensity being 0.47 and labour 0.53.
Both the CG and SA algorithms identify σ < 1, suggesting substitution exists between the
inputs into health-service production, but unlike the other algorithms, capital and labour are not
highly substitutable for each other. With σ = 0.77 for the CG algorithm, capital and labour can
be relatively easily substituted for each other within the production process. The SA algorithm,
with σ = 0.65, suggests substitution is possible, however, more difficult than estimated within
the CG algorithm.
7.3 Single Equation Box-Cox Production Function
[Bairam(1994)] describes a modification of the Cobb-Douglas / CES production function that
employs a Box-Cox transformation on its input and output variables.
Y λ − 1
λ
= A(t) + α
(
Lλ − 1
λ
)
+ β
(
Kλ − 1
λ
)
(62)
Bairam’s Box-Cox transformation has the advantage of encapsulating both Cobb-Douglas and
CES technology within its parameters when λ = 0 or λ < 1, respectively. Figure 18 below
presents the results of a grid search for λ whose estimated value is 0.897. From equation (53),
λ = 0.897 meaning σ = 9.71, making the underlying technology close to perfect input substitutes.
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Figure 18: Grid Search Values for Lamba: BC Production Model
Estimating equation (62) above with the grid-search value of λ = 0; 1; 0.897 produces the
following estimates:
Table 7: Box-Cox Production Function: Cobb-Douglas, Linear and Unrestricted CES
Dependent variable:
BC Output
Lamba = 0 (CD) Lamba = 1 (Linear) Unrestricted CES
(1) (2) (3)
BC Labour 0.025∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.025) (0.022)
BC Capital 0.352∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.023) (0.024)
Constant 0.002 0.030∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.008) (0.004)
Observations 515 515 515
R2 0.873 0.965 0.959
Adjusted R2 0.872 0.965 0.959
Residual Std. Error (df = 512) 0.031 0.0002 0.008
F Statistic (df = 2; 512) 1,753.626∗∗∗ 6,995.537∗∗∗ 6,059.469∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Of the three models in Table (7), the perfect substitutes specification has both the highest
fit to the data, and highest overall model F-Statistic. The estimated input factor intensities for
the perfect substitute model are close to the factor intensity for both Model 1 in Table (6) and
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the values generated by the CG CES algorithm.
7.4 CES System-of-Equations: Two factors-of-production
The non-linear CES two factors system-of-equations described in the systems-of-equations (59)
was estimated using the nlsystemfit function in the systemfit library of the R statistical language,
with less than impressive effect. Regardless of starting values past to the non-linear estimation
function, unfortunately the system would not converge.
The specification of the system as a two input production function with labour and capital
marginal productivities defining DHB Provider Arm demand for labour and capital was described
in R within the following code which failed to converge to an estimatable solution:
kk <- Scaled_Monthly_Output ~ Hicks_Neutral_Tech_Progress * (Delta*(All_Labour^(-Rho)) * (1-Delta)*(Capital_Quantity_Estimate^(-Rho)))^(-1/Rho)
mm <- log(Capital_Cost) ~ KapLabourVar * log(All_Labour) + KapCapitalVar * log(Capital_Quantity_Estimate)
ll <- log(Labour_Cost) ~ LabourCapVar * log(All_Labour) + LabLabourVar * log(Capital_Quantity_Estimate)
system <- list( Production = kk, LabourMarket = ll, CapitalMarket = mm)
start.values <- c(Hicks_Neutral_Tech_Progress=1, Delta = .7, Rho = .3,
KapLabourVar = 10, KapCapitalVar = -10,
LabourCapVar = 10, LabLabourVar = -10)
CES <- nlsystemfit(method = "SUR",
eqns = system,
startvals = start.values,
data = Two_Input_Econometric_Frame,
maxiter=1000)
## Error in qr.solve(t(X) %*% SI %*% X, tol = solvtol): singular matrix ’a’ in
solve
7.5 CD system-of-equations: Two Inputs
With the failure of the nonlinear CES system-of-equations to solve, a linearised CD system-of-
equations was estimated. The linear nature of the functional specification ensures the system
will converge to an solution in estimation.
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Table (8) expands out the CD modelling introduced in Table (6). Table (8) contains two
system-of-equations of a CD production function with two inputs of capital and labour, with
the second system-of-equation modified to allow tertiary providers differences to operate in both
the production and the input markets.
rotating
The two input-only production functions of Tables (8) and (6) are equivalent; however,
the inclusion of the labour and capital input market dimensions identify significant differences
between secondary and tertiary providers within both the input markets. In the labour market,
secondary care providers have a correctly signed and low price elasticity of labour demand;
however, tertiary labour demand is incorrectly signed. Average labour costs decline with
increasing secondary care labour employment, as expected from decreasing labour productivity.
Conversely, labour costs increase with secondary care capital inputs, reflecting the effects of
increases in scale.
In the capital market, secondary care providers have no statistically significant impact on
capital costs: regardless of their scale of operation, secondary provider production fundamentals
have no impact on the capital costs they face.
In contrast, tertiary provider labour costs increase with both labour and capital inputs.
Tertiary providers face increases in capital costs with scale: capital costs increase both their
workforce size and their capital inputs increase.
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8 Cobb-Douglas System-of-Equations: Multiple Inputs
Table (9) is the final extension of the system-of-equations models, capturing all five labour inputs
plus capital, and all five labour inputs plus capital with production separated out by secondary
/ tertiary.
A Cobb-Douglas production function, split by secondary/tertiary DHB Provider, was esti-
mated for five labour and one capital input into the health service production process. With an
R2 value of 0.98, the production function has an extremely high fit to the data. Both secondary
and tertiary providers show indications of decreasing returns-to-scale.65
The actual and expected modelling results from Table (9) are graphed in section (8.4).
8.1 Heteroscedastic and Serially-Correlated Errors
Figures (19)-(32) present the auto-correlation functions (ACF) and the model residuals from the
system-of-equations estimated from Table (9). Panel data, with its time-series and cross-sectional
properties, is prone to serially-correlated and heteroscedastic errors.
The ACF functions enable serial-correlation within the model residuals to be visually
ascertained for each DHB Provider Arm modelled equation from Table (9). Similarly, a plot of
the residuals over time can be used to identify the extent of any heteroscedasticity issue.
Focusing on the ACF function first, the following DHBs show significant auto-correlation
spikes at the non-zero frequency:
• ACF Production Function: Southern, Taranaki, Waitemata and Whanganui.
• ACF Medical Labour Market: Southern, Taranaki, and Waikato
• ACF Nursing Labour Market: Taranaki
• ACF Allied Health Labour Market: Hutt Valley, MidCentral, Nelson-Marlborough, and
Taranaki
• ACF Support Labour Market: Canterbury, Capital and Coast, Southern, Taranaki, and
Whanganui. Both Southern and Whanganui show significant serially-correlated errors.
65The sum of the production coefficients, σ = 0.83 for secondary care, and σ = 0.49 for tertiary providers.
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• ACF ManAdmin Labour Market: Canterbury, Nelson-Marlborough, Taranaki, West Coast,
and Whanganui. Both the West Coast and Whanganui show significantly serially-correlated
errors.
• ACF Capital Market: All DHBs show significant errors.
The ACF Capital Market plots show significant serial-correlation across all DHBs, suggesting
the capital model might be significantly misspecified in the system-of-equations model. Individ-
ually, Southern, Taranaki and Whanganui DHBs all display mild degrees of serial-correlation
within their production model errors. For Taranaki, data issues affect the labour measures
through the HWIP data source, suggesting Taranaki’s results should be viewed with caution.
Examining the residual plots, the following DHBs show issues with their residuals.
• Production Function Residuals: Southern, Tairawhiti, Whanganui, and Waitemata
• Medical Labour Market Residuals: Southern, Taranaki, Waikato
• Nursing Labour Market Residuals: Taranaki, Tairawhiti, and Nelson-Marlborough
• Allied Health Labour Market Residuals: Capital and Coast, Taranaki, West Coast
• Support Labour Market Residuals: Capital and Coast, Whanganui, Southern. Southern
looks like it has a level shift in its errors.
• ManAdmin Labour Market Residuals: Canterbury, West Coast, and Whanganui. Both
the West Coast and Canterbury show strong serial-correlation.
• Capital Market Residuals: All DHBs show significant errors.
Again, the Capital Market Residuals look particularly suspect, confirming its results ought
to be viewed with caution. Southern and Whanganui DHBs residuals suggest thier results ought
to be treated with some caution.
8.2 Health Sector Labour Markets
Across the labour markets, the coefficients of the own labour variables are either negatively
signed, or statistically insignificant, as would be expected from diminishing marginal returns
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for each input. The own-input signs for both medical and the nursing labour demand are
price-inelastic, medical (-0.396) more than nursing (-0.486). Support labour demand is also price
inelastic (-0.593), but less inelastic than nursing and medical labour. Allied Health’s labour
demand elasticity is not statistically different from zero, and ManAdmin labour demand is
price-elastic (-1.105).
The high medical and nursing labour price inelasticity creates the potential for unions to
exploit their “monopoly face”: lifting both labour prices, and reducing employed workforce
volumes, compared to a competitive labour market outcome. If the medical workforce expanded
by 10%, then medical labour costs would only fall by 3.96%. If medical labour costs increased
by 10%, then only 4% fewer medical workforce would be employed. If the nursing workforce
increased by 10%, then nursing labour costs would fall by 4.86%. If nursing labour costs increased
by 10%, then 5.1% fewer nurses would be employed. If ManAdmin employed labour expanded
by 10%, then their labour costs would fall by 11%. If ManAdmin tried to increase their labour
costs by 10%, then 11% of their workforce would become unemployed.
8.3 Health Service Production and Labour Market Comparative Statics
The structure of the system-of-equation modelling introduces a rich depth of complexity to
modelling comparative static changes since now disturbances to either the production or the
labour markets “perturb” through the production/labour market system. The inter-related
nature of the production function induces secondary labour market price effects within other
workforces. The DHB Provider Arm average monthly values for the inputs into production
for the 2011 financial year, separated by secondary/tertiary provider, were used to undertake
comparative static analysis of Table (9) results.66
The structure of Table (9) implies changes in workforce size and composition have separate
effects on secondary and tertiary provider output depending on the relative sizes of each workforce
and their production function coefficient. However, the labour market impacts reflect the size of
the combined workforces and changes in secondary/tertiary workforce “equilibrate” within the
single labour market which responds to total workforce size.
66The values for the inputs were:
Secondary Providers: Capital = 4829.987, Medical Labour = 150.5, Nursing Labour = 510.08, Allied Health
Labour = 206.21, Support Labour = 122.57, ManAdmin = 322.9883
Tertiary Providers: Capital = 23068.1, Medical Labour = 681.73, Nursing Labour = 1994.41, Allied Health
Labour = 950.85, Support Labour = 444.58, ManAdmin = 1100.27
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8.3.1 Medical Labour +/- 10%
Medical labour makes the largest contribution to health-service volume production for both
secondary and tertiary providers; however, the output volume impact of medical labour change
differs between providers. Increasing medical labour for both secondary and tertiary providers
by 10.0% increases health service output by 6.0% and 3.6% for each provider, respectively,
reflecting the higher medical labour productivities for secondary providers. Total Provider Arm
health-service output increases by 4.1%.
In the labour market, 10% more medical labour decreases medical labour prices by 3.7%,
while inducing smaller labour price increases for the less expensive nursing (0.5%), support
(3.9%) and ManAdmin (3.8%) workforces. DHB Provider Arm medical costs - the combined
price and volume effects of the 10% increase in medical labour - increase 5.9% across both
secondary and tertiary providers. Across all DHBs, the total labour costs over all workforces
increase 2.5%.
Decreasing medical labour by 10% in secondary and tertiary care results in a disproportionate
fall in the respective provider output volumes. Secondary care output decreases 6.2% and tertiary
output declines 3.9%. With few medical workforce available, medical labour prices increase by
4.3%. Nursing, support and ManAdmin labour prices fall 0.5%, 4.1% and 4.1% respectively.
Allied health labour prices are relatively unaffected.
DHB Provider Arm medical costs, in total, fall 6.2% through the combined price and quantity
effects. Across all DHBs, total labour costs decrease 2.6%.
Transmitting Costs Through the Labour Market
If the tertiary provider medical workforce alone decreases 10%, tertiary provider output would
fall 3.9%. However, decreasing the tertiary medical workforce in tertiary providers puts pressure
on the national medical labour market, increasing total medical labour prices by 3.4%. The
medical labour cost inflation, originating within the tertiary-employed workforce, induces labour
price changes over all of the other workforces.
Secondary providers, despite no change occurring to employed workforce volumes, experience
the labour price inflation transmitted through the labour market from the decrease in the tertiary
medical workforce. Secondary provider medical workforce costs, the combined price and volume
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effects, increase 3.4% purely through the inflation stemming from the medical labour market
and the decrease in tertiary employed medical labour.
Total workforce costs across all DHB Provider Arms decrease 2.2%, however, tertiary provider
total workforce costs fall 2.7% and secondary provider total workforce costs increase 0.3% purely
through transmitted inflation effects.
8.3.2 Nursing Labour +/- 10%
Table (9) indicates tertiary providers show signs of their nursing workforce being “too large”,
while secondary providers have scope for more nursing employment within their workforces.
Increasing the tertiary nursing workforce, ceteris paribus, results in a 2.1% decline in tertiary
health service production; however, a 10% increase in secondary care nursing increases secondary
care output by 2.6%, resulting in a total decline in health service output of 1.1% across all DHBs.
In the labour markets, all workforces except for the support workers experience a decline in
labour prices, with allied health and nursing itself experiencing the largest decreases.67 Medical
labour prices fall 1.4%.
DHB Provider Arm nursing costs, in total, increase 5.0% through the combined price and
quantity effects from the 10% increase in employed nurses. Across all DHBs, total labour costs
increase 0.4%. A 10% decrease in the employed nursing workforce size decreases total nursing
costs by 5.3% through price and quantity effects. Total DHB labour costs would also decline
0.2%.
If the nursing workforce was rebalanced with no change in the total workforce size through
tertiary providers decreasing their nursing workforce by 10%, and secondary providers increasing
their nursing workforce by 39%, then IF such a change did occur, nationally, total health service
output would increase by 3.9% with no added increase in DHB Provider Arm costs. Since the
labour market size remains unchanged, there would be no68 pressure on labour cost inflation
across the workforces. Secondary provider output would increase by 9.4%, and tertiary output
would increase by 2.4% for no net increase in labour costs across all DHB Provider Arms.
67Allied health declines 6.9%, and nursing declines 4.5%
68Excluding migration transaction costs.
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8.3.3 Allied Health Labour +/- 10%
Changing the allied health workforce employed within DHB Provider Arms has a significant
effect on the labour prices of virtually all other health workforces. A 10% increase in both the
secondary and tertiary provider allied health workforces generates a 2.2% increase in total health
services produced within DHBs. However, increased allied health labour induces a 3.4% increase
in medical labour prices, a 2.7% increase in nursing labour prices, a 3.8% increase in ManAdmin
prices and a negligible 0.7% increase in allied health own-labour price. Only support labour’s
price falls 6.0%.
DHB Provider Arm allied health costs, in total, increase 10.8% through the combined price
and quantity effects. Across all DHBs, total labour costs increase 4.1%.
In contrast, a 10% reduction in allied health workforce has an opposite effect on providers:
total output falls 2.4%, medical labour prices fall 3.7%, nursing labour price falls 2.9%, ManAdmin
labour price falls 4.0%, allied health labour price falls 0.8% and support labour prices increase
7.1%. DHB Provider Arm allied health costs, in total, decrease 10.7% through the combined
price and quantity effects. Across all DHBs, total labour costs decrease 4.3%.
Allied health seems to be a workforce which has significant inter-dependencies with other
health sector workforce groups, such that changing the number of allied health workers employed
within DHBs induces significant labour inflation within other workforce groups. Allied health
has a significant private sector market69 outside of MECAs which might organise health service
delivery at lower cost.
8.3.4 Support Labour +/- 10%
As expected with a workforce that “supports” health care delivery, altering the size of the
support workforce +/- 10% has little effect on the volume of health services delivered nationally.
A 10% increase in support workers nationally would increase health service output by 0.7%.
However, within the labour market, medical, allied health and ManAdmin labour prices would
all increase 1.3%, 2.1% and 1.4% respectively. Support worker own-labour price would decline
5.5%.
DHB Provider Arm support costs, in total, would increase 3.0% through the combined price
69See Appendix (A.1.3)
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and quantity effects of the 10% support worker change. Across all DHBs, total labour costs
increase 2.3%, mainly through large induced effects occurring within tertiary providers.
8.3.5 Management and Administration Labour +/- 10%
Management and administration labour (ManAdmin) are negatively signed within both secondary
and tertiary production functions, suggesting ManAdmin labour decrease the volume of health-
services produced by DHBs. However, ManAdmin are also negatively signed in the labour
market functions suggesting ManAdmin play a role in affecting labour market prices for different
health-sector workforces. While the ManAdmin workforces do not directly produce health care,
Table (9) suggests they actively decrease the cost of employing other workforces, potentially
through improving workforce co-ordination, and generating workforce efficiencies.
A 10% increase in ManAdmin labour would decrease secondary provider production by 6.5%
and tertiary production by 1.8%. However, in the labour market, a 10% increase in employed
ManAdmin labour decreases medical labour prices by 3.7%, nursing labour prices by 1.7% and
ManAdmin prices by 10.0% for all providers.
Increasing the ManAdmin workforce decreases secondary provider output by the largest
proportion; however, contributes to the tertiary provider labour cost savings the most. Tertiary
output declines 1.8%, but total labour costs across all workforce groups employed by tertiary
providers decrease 3.0%. For secondary providers, output falls 6.5%, and total labour costs
decline by a smaller 1.8%.
Contrary effects are noticeable for a 10% reduction in ManAdmin labour. Secondary provider
output increases 7.7%, and tertiary provider output increases 2.1%. Within the labour market,
medical, nursing and ManAdmin labour prices increase 4.3%, 2.0% and 12.3%, respectively.
Total tertiary provider labour costs, the combined price and quantity effects of the 10% decrease
in ManAdmin labour, increase 3.5%. Total secondary provider labour costs increase 2.0%. Total
DHB labour costs, across tertiary and secondary providers, increase 3.2%.
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8.3.6 Auto-correlation Functions of Model Residuals
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8.3.7 Hetroskedasticity in the Model Errors
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8.4 Cobb-Douglas System-of-Equations with Tertiary: Graphical Results
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A Background to the New Zealand Health Sector
A.1 Health-sector Industries
Statistics New Zealand’s (SNZ) Business Demographics information provides an overview of
the sub-industries comprising the health-sector, and how they have changed over time. Using
the Australia New Zealand Standard Industry Classification (ANZSIC), the ”health-sector”
is 16 ANZSIC industries whose employee count and number of providers are contained in
Figure (40) below.
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A.1.1 Secondary Care
In 2012, approximately 17,000 enterprises collectively employed around 208,000 people to
deliver health care. Thirty six percent of the workforce were employed within ANZSIC
Q840100: “Hospitals (except psychiatric Hospitals)”, whom are collectively the public
and private sector “Secondary Care” providers. Government-owned DHBs employed the
majority of ANZSIC Q840100’s workforce. Between them, DHBs employ 72,000 of the
75,000 secondary care workforce.
The remaining smaller workforce within the Hospitals industry, represented private sector
secondary care providers. Private sector secondary care providers work together with
ANZSIC Q851200 (Specialist Medical Services) to provide private secondary health care in
normally an outsourcing health-service delivery model. Specialists from Q851200 contract
with private secondary care providers for the use of surgical space and post-operative care.
Consequently, the majority of the private secondary care workforce comprise nurses and
administration staff.
A.1.2 Disability Support Services
The “Disability Support Services” (DSS) sector are ANZSIC industries Q860100 (Aged
Residential Care), Q860900 (Other Residential Care) and Q879000 (Other Social Assistance
Services). DSS employed 67,000 people or approximately a third of the health-sector’s
workforce in 2012. Aged Residential Care was the second largest employer within the entire
health-sector, and comprised predominately private sector providers. ANZSIC Q860900
are residential care providers for intellectual disability or physical disability care. ANZSIC
Q879000 provides a wide variety of community-related social support service care including
adult day care centre operation; disability assistance; and youth and welfare counselling
with the other sub-industries within DSS sector its major customer.
A.1.3 Allied Health
The Allied Health industries are defined by ANZSIC sub-industries Q853100 - Q853900.
Allied Health providers are predominately private providers who deliver specialist health-
services of a specific nature. Unlike “general” practitioners, Allied Health providers specialise
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in specific illness or treatment types; for example, dentistry, or optometry which involve
dental and eye health care respectively. Collectively in 2012, the Allied Health industries
employed 28,000 people, or approximately 14% of the health-sector’s workforce, and were
almost exclusively privately owned.
A.1.4 General Practice
ANZSIC Q851100, General Practice Medical Services, are health providers who deliver
“primary care”: they are normally the first point of patient contact with the health-sector.
While multiply “entry points” into the health system exist; for example, through the
ambulance services provided by Q859100, or through the emergency departments of DHBs
in Q840100, General Practitioners are where most persons choose to initially engage with a
health professional. Collectively, General Practice employs approximately 11,000 persons,
or 5% of the health-sector’s workforce. With the exclusion of a small number of practices
on the West Coast of the South Island, almost all General Practices are exclusive privately
owned.
ANZSIC Q852000, Pathology and Diagnostic Imaging Services, are the laboratory, pathology
and specialist imaging industries (Diagnostic Health) who provide diagnostic and laboratory
services to the health-sector. Both DHBs and the private sector own enterprises within this
industry.
A.2 Economic Performance
A.2.1 Contribution to Gross Domestic Product
Constituting approximately 6.8% of New Zealand’s current price Gross Domestic Production
(GDP) for the year ending March 2010 the health-sector was New Zealand’s third largest
industry, contributing approximately $12.0 billion value added to New Zealand economy,
and similar in size to the Real Estate industry.
Between 2000 - 2010, constant price health-sector GDP grew at an average annual 4.05%
rate of growth each year, well in excess of the 2.54% growth rates experienced within the
rest of the economy. The first decade of the new millennium represented the sector’s “boom
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years” and were the culmination of two decade periods of accelerating economic growth
(Figures 42 and ??).
The sector’s recent economic growth is in stark contrast to its boom years. SNZ’s data
shows virtually no increase in health-sector constant price GDP has occurred since 2010,
despite strong economic growth occurring elsewhere within the New Zealand economy.
health-sector economic output increase on average 0.1% per year between 2010 - 2013,
despite the remainder of the economy expanding at an annual average 2.29% rate of growth
for the same period.
SNZ’s constant price value added series in Figure ?? illustrates a sudden halt to the health-
sector’s economic growth between 2010 - 2013. While SNZ’s current price gross output
series is yet to be updated and published to reflect the years 2011 onwards, the Treasury’s
Fiscal Time Series data is available for the 2010 - 2013 period.70 Central Government health
expenditure increased from $13.1 billion in 2010 up to $14.5 billion in 2013, or an annual
average 3.4% increase in funding over the 2010 - 2013 period.
In order for overall average health-sector GDP to increase by 0.1% over the 2010 - 2013
period when the publicly funded health care component increased 3.4% over the same time
means privately-funded health purchasing very suddenly and very dramatically reversed from
its 7.9% annual average decade rate of funding increase over 2000 - 2010 to approximately
a 3.5% rate of funding decline on average every year between the 2010 and 2013 years.
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70Discussed in section A.2.2 below
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Method Gamma Delta Rho Nu Elasticity
BFGS 9.828 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
Conjugate Gradients 4.455 0.398 0.298 1.015 0.77
95% CI 3.518 - 5.392 0.174 - 0.622 -0.245 - 0.841 0.994 - 1.036
Kmenta 8.01 0.119 -1.312 0.968
95% CI 5.65 - 10.369 -0.206 - 0.443 -6.216 - 3.591 0.952 - 0.985
L-BFGS-B 9.827 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
Levenberg-Marquardt 9.828 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
Nelder-Mead 8.873 0.136 -0.511 0.962 2.046
95% CI 7.369 - 10.377 0.02 - 0.252 -1.064 - 0.041 0.943 - 0.981
Newton 9.828 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
PORT 9.828 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
Simulated Annealing 5.01 0.473 0.536 0.997 0.651
95% CI 3.941 - 6.079 0.23 - 0.716 -0.039 - 1.111 0.976 - 1.017
Table 10: Two Factor Constant Elasticity of Substitution Production Function - Multiple
Optimisation Methods
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Method Gamma Delta Rho Nu Elasticity
BFGS 9.828 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
Conjugate Gradients 4.455 0.398 0.298 1.015 0.77
95% CI 3.518 - 5.392 0.174 - 0.622 -0.245 - 0.841 0.994 - 1.036
Kmenta 8.01 0.119 -1.312 0.968
95% CI 5.65 - 10.369 -0.206 - 0.443 -6.216 - 3.591 0.952 - 0.985
L-BFGS-B 9.827 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
Levenberg-Marquardt 9.828 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
Nelder-Mead 8.873 0.136 -0.511 0.962 2.046
95% CI 7.369 - 10.377 0.02 - 0.252 -1.064 - 0.041 0.943 - 0.981
Newton 9.828 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
PORT 9.828 0.139 -0.482 0.95 1.931
95% CI 8.173 - 11.482 0.019 - 0.259 -1.043 - 0.079 0.931 - 0.969
Simulated Annealing 5.01 0.473 0.536 0.997 0.651
95% CI 3.941 - 6.079 0.23 - 0.716 -0.039 - 1.111 0.976 - 1.017
Table 11: Two Factor Constant Elasticity of Substitution Production Function - Multiple
Optimisation Methods
Tables (??) and (??) are the SNZ Business Demographic workforce headcount and enterprise
count from Figure (40). As see graphically in Figure (40) and numerically in Tables (??)
and (??), most of the 3.5% rate of private sector funding decline effected the Allied Health,
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General Practice and the Diagnostic health-service industries.
During the decade of the health-sector’s boom years, the General Practice workforce grew
an average 2.75% each year. Since 2010, its rate of workforce growth has fallen to 0.6%,
or under a quarter of its previous decade average. General Practice enterprise numbers,
having previously increased by 1.25% on average each year over the boom years, have now
reversed and have declined an average 1.1% each year since 2010.
The Allied Health workforce during the boom years experienced average annual rates of
growth of 3.8% each year between 2000 - 2010. Since 2010, the industry’s workforce has
declined 4.2% on average every year. While the number of Allied Health provider enterprises
increased 3.4% on average every year between 2000 - 2010, since 2010, their numbers have
declined by 1.0% every year.
The majority of the Allied Health industry’s decline was experienced in “Q853900 Other
Allied health-services” whose health-services include audiology, dental hygiene, dietician
services, midwifery and podiatry care.71 Q853900 experienced an average 6% decline in
employment numbers and a 2% decline in providers since 2010. Private sector health
spending retrenchment can be seen across the board in other Allied Health industries.
The Diagnostic health-service workforce, expanding on average by 2.0% per year over 2000 -
2010, but shrank an average of 2.6% each year between 2010 - 2012.
A.2.2 Sources of Health Service Funding
The health-sector received approximately $18.5 billion worth of funding in 2010, $13 billion
of which was purchased by the New Zealand Treasury on behalf of New Zealanders. The
remaining $5.5 billion was purchased by private organisations like private insurers, and
directly by the household sector. As a proportion of total Crown Revenue, health funding
has increased from approximately 12.8% of total Crown revenue in 1997 up to 17.6% by
2010, its highest proportion over the 1997 - 2013 period.
Achieving “sustainability” in all aspects of health care, including its financial sustainability,
has been one of the National-led Government’s policy directions since its election in 2008
with a number of policy initiatives undertaken to reduce the rate of health expenditure
71[of Statistics(2006)] page 347
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growth.72 As a result, since 2010, the proportion of total Crown Revenue directed towards
health expenditure has fallen from its 2010 high of 17.6% to approximately 16.7% in 2013.
72http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/speech-address-nz-healthcare-summit-2013
134
Deriving a timeseries for separating out public / private health-sector funding sources is
complicated by the Government’s change from cash to an accrual accounting basis in 1990,
and its move to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in 1996. Even with these caveats
in mind, Figure 43 suggests a significant proportion of the 3.89% increase in constant price
health-sector GDP over the 1990 - 2000 period in Figure ?? was derived from increased
private sector health-service funding.
While the Central Government funded approximately 71% of the health-sector in 2010,
historically it had purchased a significantly higher proportion of the health-sector’s output.
In 1992, the Central Government funded 76.6% of the health-sector. By the end of the
decade, Central Government purchasing declined to approximately 74.0% of health-services
as private sector funding sources increased to reflect demand. Private sector health funding
increased from 23.4% in 1992 to 26.0% by 2000.
Over the first decade of the new millennium, when constant price health-sector GDP
recorded its largest decade annual average rate of growth of 4.05% each year between 2000 -
2010, the proportion of private health care funding increased from 26.0% of total health-
sector Gross Output in 2000 to 29.1% of Gross Output by 2010. Publicly-funded health
care declined from 74.0% of total Gross Output in 2000 to 70.9% by 2010. Private sector
health-service funding increases contributed significantly to the high rate of health-service
constant price GDP growth.
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A.2.3 Impact on Health Sector Incomes
While the period 2000 - 2010 saw private sector health funding increase significantly, recent
years have witnessed severe private expenditure retrenchment. Private expenditure decreases
have driven declines in both the number of private providers delivering health care, and the
number of persons they employ. Coming off a decade of strong economic growth, median
income growth rates for workers in the different health industries have slowed in recent
years. The industries have also been affected unequally.
Figure (44), from SNZ’s Linked Employer-Employee Database (LEED), measures the
quarterly median earnings for employees within the different health-sector industry over
time.
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Given the different workforces skill mix, their composition and the nature of health-services
they provide, the median incomes of each industry are likely to (and do) differ significantly
between each industry. DHBs have the highest median earnings, followed by the “Other
health care services” and the Diagnostic health-service industry. “Other health care services”,
which include ANZSICs Q859100 (Ambulance Services) and Q859900 (Other Health Care
Services NEC), show the second highest median earnings after DHBs.
At the other end of the income spectrum, Residential Care Services and Other Social
Assistance - within the DSS health-service sector - have the lowest median wage across all
health industries. As the second largest employer within the health-sector, employment
growth within the DSS sector has been in the lowest paid health-sector jobs. Figure (45),
derived from Figure (44) data, with the quarterly variation smoothed to reveal the underlying
trend, illustrates how quarterly median incomes have changed over time. Other Health Care
has both the second highest median worker earnings within the health-sector and has shown
the largest increase over time.
The slowdown in Allied Health employee earnings growth around 2008 reflects the decline
in private sector spending, probably related to the financial issues felt generally at that
time. The elderly are significant consumers of health care. If their and other health care
consumers financial wealth were diminished at that time, then conceivably their Allied
Health care expenditure might reduce, impacting on enterprise numbers, employment growth
and median incomes.
“Other Social Assistance services” median income growth differs significantly from other
industries. For approximately four of the ten boom years, employee median earnings growth
stagnated while other incomes increased significantly. Even with an increase in median
earnings over recent years, employees within this industry are still the lowest paid (Figure
44), and have experienced the least earnings growth (Figure (45)
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A.3 District Health Boards
A.3.1 Funders and Providers of Health Care
The vast majority of health-services are delivered by DHBs who operate in a highly non-
competitive health-service output market. DHBs were established as Crown Entities by
the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 (PHDA) taking over both the
funder and provider roles which had been previously split between the Health Funding
Authority(HFA), as funder, and Health and Hospital Service (HHS) healthcare providers.
Section 95 of the PHDA formally dissolved all of the HHS and vested their assets in DHBs,
establishing each DHB’s “Provider Arm”. Section 25 of the PHDA empowered the DHB to
purchase health-services from third parties, establishing their “Funder Arm”.
Operationally, DHB Funder Arms are funded through Vote Health to purchase health care
for each DHB population. DHBs are required to submit annual Production Plans to the
MoH as part of the Accountability Framework73 governing DHB funding and monitoring.
Both the Funder and the Provider Arm are accountable to a common Chief Executive
Officer and a common Governance Board with a Minister of Health appointed DHB Chair.
DHBs dominate the health-sector’s employment statistics and are the main mechanism
for Central Government-funded health-service delivery. New Zealand has a large number
of private sector health providers delivering in the Primary Health, DSS, Diagnostic, and
Allied health-sectors; however, Government funding still dominates these industry’s funding
sources.
Each year, the MoH compiles from its DHB monitoring information an estimate of the
value of expenditure spent on different health-service areas split by DHB Funder/Provider
Arm and Major Service Groups (MSG). Figure (46) presents how aggregate health-service
expenditure has changed over time, split by DHB Funder/Provider arms and MSG.
73http://www.nsfl.health.govt.nz/apps/nsfl.nsf/menumh/Accountability+Documents
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Funder Arm health expenditure is dominated by a “Remainder” group: a grouping derived
by this thesis to reflect health-service expenditure not captured within the other MSG
groupings. The major components of the Funder Arm Remainder group in 2011 were:
• Inter-district transfer payments between DHBs ($ 1.209 bill)
• Pharmaceutical expenditure ($1.017 bill)
• Capitation-based funding to Primary Care ($762 mill)
• Laboratory costs ($233 mill)
DSS and Mental Health are the two other largest recipients of DHB-originated funding,
although showing different funding histories compared to similar services provided through
DHB Provider Arms (Figure (46)). Funder Arm DSS received approximately $1.190 billion
in 2011, having increased from $478 million in 2004, and reflecting a high average annual
14% increase in health funding over this time. Provider Arm DSS has increased by an
average annual 11.4% over the same period. Funder Arm Mental Health increased from $224
million in 2004 up to $433 million in 2011, an average annual increase of 10% each year.
Within DHB Provider Arms, Mental Health expenditure increased from $562 million to
$862 million over the same time, a 6.3% annual average increase in health-service funding.
While both DSS and Mental Health Funder Arm funding have increased faster than the
same MSG service provided by DHB Provider Arms, the nature of the services being funded
involve significantly different models of care. Changes from hospital-based to community-
based Mental Health care in the mid-1990’s imply most of the capital costs associated with
mental health-service delivery now exist within the private sector rather than within DHBs.
Provider Arm-based mental health-services now mainly focus on short-term inpatient care
to stabilise patients experiencing acute mental health illness. Community-based mental
health-services focus on the patient’s continued support within the community and involve
a much longer-term care focus.
Within DSS, [Thornton(2010)] found the proportion of private sector funded Aged Resi-
dential Care clients were falling over the period 2000 - 2008, whilst over the same time,
the number of Government subsidised clients were increasing.74 Given low worker median
earnings and low median earnings growth rates, together with New Zealand’s increasingly
74[Thornton(2010)] Table 25, page 77
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elderly population75, the increased DSS funding through DHB Funder Arms has more than
likely expanded the volume of DSS care purchased from private sector DSS providers to
reflect both the increasing elderly demand, and a shift from private to publicly-funded DSS
care.
Financial Year DSS Maori Health Maternity Medical Mental Health Neonatal Outpatients Paediatrics Public Health Remainder Surgical
2004 478,091 8,569 18,803 752 223,617 -49 -16,587 3,559 12,165 2,279,143 27,715
2005 673,233 24,833 19,598 6,687 370,444 -54 -16,916 4,056 8,736 2,399,164 35,154
2006 824,396 35,349 19,562 9,291 380,030 658 8,922 -61 6,000 2,528,508 16,782
2007 904,285 40,153 20,670 8,900 392,533 208 19,195 120 5,763 2,766,647 8,269
2008 1,002,162 36,901 22,547 899 369,219 80 21,112 545 9,805 3,123,841 16,302
2009 1,074,311 42,254 21,785 3,103 398,955 -68 28,540 -166 19,626 3,336,957 17,405
2010 1,147,400 43,100 33,805 1,254 409,120 -81 25,024 164 19,807 3,532,354 13,465
2011 1,190,230 42,368 33,019 761 433,297 5 41,879 174 15,954 3,660,611 19,494
Table 12: DHB Funder Arm Health Expenditure Over Time ($000)
Financial Year DSS Maori Health Maternity Medical Mental Health Neonatal Outpatients Paediatrics Public Health Remainder Surgical
2004 131,423 869 113,763 425,977 561,227 54,262 318,251 357,037 -66 1,185,873 539,934
2005 182,722 611 123,061 445,146 597,205 49,284 364,346 73,405 4,023 1,610,235 611,159
2006 193,519 1,006 126,201 490,180 635,064 54,002 387,012 77,635 9,185 1,806,643 661,578
2007 169,812 670 123,992 526,935 693,063 57,823 443,395 89,913 1,683 1,975,921 712,140
2008 220,999 1,243 144,922 648,047 743,477 66,732 506,603 104,358 3,592 1,945,941 878,262
2009 240,407 3,937 201,693 929,227 794,349 110,649 807,151 200,283 12,963 1,071,771 1,376,316
2010 274,603 2,861 255,842 1,082,949 844,854 126,877 812,310 220,022 12,456 1,064,032 1,538,055
2011 279,844 4,909 274,100 1,138,656 861,871 126,044 855,782 230,089 22,246 1,026,095 1,656,700
Table 13: DHB Provider Arm Health Expenditure Over Time ($000)
Despite private sector hardship over 2010 - 2013, and Government pressure for DHB’s
to be “financial sustainability”, DHB Provider Arm workforces continued to expand.76
Provider Arm health-service expenditure growth occurred within Personal Health Surgical,
Medical and Outpatient health-services. The National government, elected in 2008, made
reducing elective surgery waiting times one of its health manifesto commitments. Once
elected, Provider Arm Personal Health Surgical health-service funding increased from $878
million for the year ending June 2008, up to $1.37 billion for the year ending June 2009, a
57% increase in total funding (Table 13).
The Provider Arm “Remainder” group in Table (13) comprises expenditure that has either
no underlying health quantity measures, or were payments for services whose quantities
were either unmeasured or poorly measured. Community provided health care, like district
nursing, tends to be poor measured within DHB systems.
In 2011, the Provider Arm “Remainder” group larger spending items were:
• Emergency Services ($167 mill)
• Price Adjusters and Premium ($159 mill)
75[Thornton(2010)] Figure 37, page 78
76Table (??)
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• Domiciliary District Nursing ($133 mill)
• Child (School) Dental Services ($81 mill)
• Community based Allied Health ($56 mill)
• Child and Youth ($49 mill)
• Chronic Disease Management and Education ($30 mill)
A.3.2 ”Good Employer” Obligations
Figure 47: DHB Objectives: Section 22 New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000
In addition to a range of health-related roles described in Figure (47), one of the legislated
objectives of DHBs is for them to be “good employer[s]”. Section 118 Crown Entities Act
outlines the requirements of a “good employer” (Figure (48)).
Through inheriting S(118)(2) Crown Entities Act 2004, DHBs are required to provide both
good and safe working conditions for their employees. Each appointment they make to a role
must have been an impartial selection of the successful applicant from the pool of suitably
qualified persons. As good employers, DHBs have to have policies which create opportunities
for individuals to promote and enhance their abilities. Finally, as good employers, DHBs
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Figure 48: Good Employers: Section 118 Crown Entities Act 2004
must have in place programmes that identify and eliminate all aspects of policies, procedures
or barriers that perpetuate inequality for any person or group of persons.
The importance of S22 New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 and S118 Crown
Entities Act 2004 relates to labour market theory described in Section 2 of this thesis.
Briefly, one of the reasons for unions and union activity is to act as a counter-balance and
check on the power of monopsony employers: single employers that can exert monopoly
power to reduce employment wages and terms and conditions below a competitive market
level. While DHBs do act collectively and co-coordinating their labour market efforts, S22
New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 and S118 Crown Entities Act 2004 act
as a very real impediment for DHBs exerting market power to exploit the health-sector’s
workforce.
Legislatively, at the heart of the machinery which created them, DHBs are obliged to act
fairly, impartially and act to remove inequality within their work environments, a legislative
requirement seemingly at odds with the MECA agreement with the NZRDA that preference
will be given to New Zealand medical graduates.
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B The Health-sector Labour Market
B.1 Legislative Framework
The Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003 (HPCA) is the overarching
legislation which governs who may use titles protected by the Act or claim to be practising
a profession that is regulated by the Act. Essentially, no person may claim to be restricted
type of health professional or practitioner unless the person is a health practitioner of that
kind and holds a current practising certificate for that role. The HPCA Act deliberately
acts as a barrier-to-entry into restricted health-sector professions; however, its principal
purpose is the protection of public health and safety through providing a mechanisms to
ensure that health practitioners are competent and fit to practise their professions.77
Accountability for practitioner ability is vested in 16 ”Responsible Authorities” (RAs) who
authoritatively determine who is, or is not, fit to deliver health-services in New Zealand.
Each RA must publish the contents of their profession in terms of one or more Scopes of
Practice. No health practitioner may perform a health-service unless that health-service
forms part of a Scope of Practice that they are permitted to perform. And in order to
receive a Scope of Practice, Practitioners must be fit for registration as a health professional
and have the qualifications and abilities prescribed by the HPCA for that Scope of Practice.
All Scopes must set out the qualification or experience needed by a qualified professional to
properly hold a Scope; however, there are some principles RAs need to consider when they
define the minimum Scope qualifications. Section 13 HPCA requires each RA to consider
only qualifications that are necessary to protect members of the public and not unnecessarily
restrictions on the registration of persons as health practitioners. The minimum qualifications
for each Scope should not impose undue costs on health practitioners or on the public.
The breadth and depth of each Scopes of Practice varies with each RA. For example, the
Chiropractic Board oversees one single Chiropractic Scope of Practice.78 Similarly, the
Dieticians Board has one Scope of Practice79, whose entry requirements consist of a two
year Master’s degree through the Universities of Otago, Auckland or Massey. Even some of
the larger workforce groups have only a moderate number of Scopes of Practice governing
77Section 3 Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003
78http://www.chiropracticboard.org.nz/html/blob.php/Scope%20of%20Practice%20-
%202010.pdfattach=false&documentCode=82012
79http://www.dietitiansboard.org.nz/webfm send/119
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Figure 49: Health Practitioner Competency Assurance Act 2003: Responsible Authorities
their professions. The Nursing Council of New Zealand, which oversees the largest single
health-sector workforce group, the Nursing profession, defines three Scopes of Practice to
cover the full breadth of their professional activity.80
B.1.1 Entering the Medical Profession
The medical profession labour market is highly non-competitive with significant barriers
existing, primarily through the Medical Council of New Zealand’s (MCNZ, an RA under
the HPCA Act), policies for persons seeking entry-level access into the medical profession.
Even obtaining a medical degree is supply-constrained. The number of undergraduate
medical places within universities is capped to a maximum level by Government policy. If a
student is successful and admitted, the tuition cost they face is the highest of any degree
and its duration the longest. Medical students come out with a very high level of student
loan indebtedness; however, their employment opportunities post-graduation are limited by
design. Medical students must take internships within DHBs.
The limited number of positions available within DHBs for the medical student internships
has acted as a barrier-to-entry for overseas-trained medical graduates obtaining work within
the medical profession. Responding to the limited internship opportunities in DHBs, the
80Enrolled Nurse (http://www.nursingcouncil.org.nz/Nurses/Scopes-of-practice/Enrolled-nurse), a Registered
Nurse (http://www.nursingcouncil.org.nz/Nurses/Scopes-of-practice/Registered-nurse) and a Nurse Practitioner
(http://www.nursingcouncil.org.nz/Nurses/Scopes-of-practice/Nurse-practitioner)
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MCNZ has recently limited the number of persons it allows to sit its NZREX Clinical entry
exam, the first stage in obtaining a General Scope of Practice.
B.2 Obtaining a Medical Degree
The Government restricts entry into Medical degrees to 505 places across the Universities
of Otago and Auckland.81. Medicine is also one of the most expensive per year under-
graduate degrees82 and, with a 6 year duration, the longest duration. Whether, given its
high Government and Student fee structure, there is a financial incentive for Universities to
prolong its duration is unclear. Likewise, the potentially role government capping of tuition
places makes on keeping medical tuition fees high is likewise unclear.
Health Workforce New Zealand (HWNZ), a business unit inside the MoH, established a
working group to examine the potential for a four-year Graduate Entry Programme (GEP)
for medicine.83 From both the literature and overseas experience, HWNZ found GEPs:84
• can produce comparable educational outcomes in shorter training time and for less
cost
• may increase diversity in entrants to medical study and can help the profession achieve
a better match between medical graduates and the general population, though diversity
is related more to selection policies than the nature of the programme
• can draw on students with more life experience and may help to change the culture of
medicine
• can result in increased student motivation, benefits to student well-being, improved
learning strategies and professional outcomes
HWNZ estimated that the tuition subsidy cost to Government for a student on a GEP
programme is less than for a student on any other route into a MBChB by about $35,000
- $46,500.85 HWNZ’s analysis did not include the tuition and living costs saved by the
student who, through GEP is studying for a shorter period of time.
81http://www.minedu.govt.nz/theMinistry/Budget/Budget13/TertiaryEducation.aspx
82Auckland university Medical Tuition costs for 2014: https://cdn.auckland.ac.nz/assets/central/documents/2013/fees-
2014-domestic-fmhs.pdf
83[Zealand(2011)]
84[Zealand(2011)] on page 4
85[Zealand(2011)] on page 6
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Although now becoming dated, [?] estimated medical students graduate with an average
$65,206 worth of study debt, having paid $11,000 per year in tuition fees. Adding two years
of student tuition fee back to HWNZ’s estimated of cost reduction to the Government
suggests GEP could potentially have saved $46,000 - $68,000 to the cost of medical training
spread across the Ministry of Education and the student.
The working group considered that the impact on the sector and the relative cost of a GEP
were critical factors in any decision to proceed. Existing medical education programmes
already faced challenges securing clinical internships in DHBs that ensure students have
access to good quality on-the-job teaching and learning experiences. Establishing a GEP
might compromising clinical access and placements in internships within DHBs. Existing
medical Universities already found attracting appropriately skilled and qualified teaching
staff difficult. A GEP, by a new training provider, would exacerbate University recruitment
across all medical schools.86
B.3 DHB Internships
Union monopoly power is strengthened by non-competitive labour markets, non-competitive
output markets and a low level of substitution for labour in the production process.
DHB internship play a critical in giving strength to unions through significantly limiting
the employments options for medical graduates, and decreasing the number of potential
workforce employers.
At the heart of the medical labour market distortions are the MCNZ policies. To gain a
General Medical Scope of Practice, the practitioner needs to work within a DHB for at least
1 year. Recent media attention has focused on the Medical Council reducing the number of
places they make available for persons to sit the NZREX Clinical exam.87 Citing the limited
number of internship places available for candidates within DHBs, the Medical Council
decreased the number of NZREX exams it offers for the 2014 year.
The lack of alternatives to DHB-based internships training requirements creates a significant
economic barrier-to-entry for persons passing NZREX Clinical, and wishing to pursue a
medical career. The Gazetted Scope of Practice notes applicants can seek an exemption to
undertake an internship outside of a DHB setting; however, the requirements are so strict
86[Zealand(2011)] on page 7
87http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/240482/foreign-doctors-demand-action-on-jobs
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as to put the exemption out of reach for many. To be eligible to apply for an exemption
to work in primary care, the applicant must have already completed a general intern year,
have passed NZREX at first attempt, have five years or more experience in primary care,
and have similar primary care practice experience. The applicant’s nominated supervisor
must not be his/her employer.88
B.4 Medical Scopes of Practice
The potential for the HPCA to act as a significant economic barrier-to-entry occurs where
an RA oversees a large variety of Scopes of Practice, each of which confers exclusive domain
to a small area of a health professional field. The practice of medicine is an example where
Scopes of Practice have been used to separate the profession into a number of exclusive
specialities. The admission policies of the Medical Council into entry-level General scopes
of practice have further increased the economic barriers into medicine. Admission criteria
into advanced medical Vocational Scopes has been limited to recognising single college
of medicine providers, effective conferring upon those industry bodies responsibility for
controlling the numbers of persons capable to delivering services within New Zealand. The
MCNZ define the practice of medicine within four types of Scope of Practice (Figure (51)).
A General Scope of Practice is applicable for doctors who are new to the medical profession;
for example, doctors who have completed their first post-graduate year. Provisional general
Scopes are initially conferred until the practitioner has completed the requirements for
progression to a General Scope of Practice.
A Special Purpose Scope of Practice is available for Medical Practitioners who are in New
Zealand for defined or limited reasons, including teaching as a visiting expert, sponsored
training, research, working as a locum tenens for up to six months, or assisting in an
emergency or other unpredictable, short-term situation. Special Purposes Scope of Practice
do not lead to permanent registration and a practitioner with a Special Purpose Scope
must work under the supervision of a registered medical practitioner for the duration of the
teaching, training, research, emergency or locum tenens.
A Vocational Scope is recognised for doctors who have completed their Vocational training as
a consultant and who have the appropriate qualifications and experience. Doctors registered
88https://www.mcnz.org.nz/assets/News-and-Publications/Gazette/Gazette-2012-A4.pdf footnote 5
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Figure 50: Medical Scopes of Practice
with a Vocational Scope are recognised by the Medical Council as specialists and may work
independently without supervision or oversight. Doctors registered with a General Scope
are not recognised as specialists. There is no limit to what General Scoped Practitioners
can do (unless their Scope of Practice is specifically limited by Council) but they must
work under the oversight of a doctor registered in the same or related Vocational Scope of
Practice as the general Scope doctor is working in, in what is called a collegial relationship.
While medical professionals can hold more than one Scope of Practice, the exclusive nature
of the Scopes implies that a “Urologist” skill-set cannot be used to perform a “Sports
Medicine” service, or a “Neurosurgical” skill-set cannot be used to deliver “General Surgery”.
The large number of field of service demarcations between the medical Scopes increase the
risk that the scopes themselves create economic barriers-to-entry, not justified by medical
specialisation.
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B.5 Becoming Medically Vocationally Scoped
Adding yet another barrier-to-entry dimension, meeting the MCNZ’s requirements for its
Vocational Scopes of Practice involve becoming accredited from a very limited number of
Medical Colleges. Figure (51), derived from the Medical Council’s Scopes of Practice89
presents the Medical College membership requirements needed before the Medical Council
will convey a Vocational Scope of Practice. Gaining accreditation requires practitioners to
become Fellows of the listed Medical Colleges.
Figure 51: Medical Vocational Scopes of Practice and their Accreditation Requirements
Some Vocational Scopes allow some choice; for example, Accident and Medical Practice,
however, the majority require membership to one of two specific colleges: the Royal
Australasian Colleges of Surgeons and Physicians. Both of those two Colleges, comprised
of practitioners already operating within those the medical profession, create single entry
points into the medical professions requiring those specific Vocational Scopes. Overseas
qualified practitioners need to satisfy the Fellowship requirements of the Royal Australasian
89https://www.mcnz.org.nz/assets/News-and-Publications/Gazette/Gazette-2012-A4.pdf
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Colleges of Surgeons and Physicians before the Medical Council will confer a Vocational
Scope of Practice to a practitioner.
C Main Health-sector Unions
Unions feature prominently in the health-sector’s operation and policy debate. The major
health-sector-specific unions are described further below. Other unions operate in the
health-sector; for example, the Service and Food Workers Unions and the Public Service
Association, but the following are the main unions focusing exclusively on health-sector
professions.
• New Zealand Resident Doctors Association (NZRDA)
The NZRDA is an incorporated society that “negotiates, protects, and improves the
collective employment interests of its members”90 collectively described as “Junior”
doctors. According to the NZRDA’s Rules of Incorporation, Junior doctor target
members are: Trainee Interns, House Surgeons or House Officers, Dental House
Surgeons, Senior House Officers, Dental Registrars, Registrars, Medical Officers from
overseas registered to work in New Zealand, and Medical or Dental Officers undertaking
medical training.
While the NZRDA’s membership size is unidentified, from DHBSS’s Health Workforce
Information Programme (HWIP) data, DHBs employed approximately 4,200 Junior
Medical workers who collectively delivered approximately 3,700 full time equivalent
(FTE) units of labour service as at 30 June 2013. The NZRDA called a strike in 200691.
At the time, 2500 Junior doctors were reported as engaged in a five-day strike. HWIP
data for the same time reveals DHBs collectively employed 2,78692 suggesting that, in
2006, the NZRDA had 90% membership of Junior doctors employed by DHBs.
An Internet search has revealed the NZRDA has taken industrial strike action involving
all its members twice in recent years, with public threats of further strikes made.93
90NZRDA Rule of Incorporation,http://www.nzrda.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/NZRDA-rules-as-
registered-13-April-20111.pdf, Clause 4.1.a
91http://tvnz.co.nz/content/752825/2591754/article.html
92HWIP Basedata, June 2006, Table 11
93
– five days in 2006: http://tvnz.co.nz/content/752825/2591754/article.html
– 48 hours in 2008: http://tvnz.co.nz/health-news/emotions-running-high-in-pay-dispute-1728526 News media
reports note the strike occurred after 11 months of protracted negotiations. NZRDA announces second strike:
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• Association of Salaried Medical Specialists (ASMS)
ASMS is an incorporated society with a large and comprehensive range of objectives
focused on protecting and promoting its members’ interests in all aspects of their
employment.94 Its members are: “Any registered medical or dental practitioner em-
ployed in New Zealand and whose employment is conditional on their holding a current
practising certificate”.95 Junior doctors or medical/dental professions employed in
universities or elsewhere in Government are specifically excluded. 96 Given the exclusion
of “Junior” doctors, ASMS is known as the “Senior” doctor’s union.
HWIP data shows DHBs collectively employed 4,800 Senior doctors who were contracted
to deliver approximately 3,800 FTEs of labour as at 30 June 2013. While ASMS’s
membership coverage is not directly observable, its website suggests ASMS represents
more than 90% of the Senior medical workforce.97
ASMS is a vocal union and uses direct public advocacy to advance its goals, actively
issuing media releases,98 publishing in the New Zealand Medical Journal,99 and seeking
to enter into the policy formulation process as its main channels. Its public profile is
emotive, with its media releases using language that describes negotiations as “lengthy
and bitter”100, and describing New Zealand’s health care system as “prey to erratic
decision-making, heavy-handed management and gaga behaviour”.101
As a measure of the cerebral-ism of its industrial action tactics, one of ASMS’s more
interesting approaches to industrial relations is to poll their members on different
industrial issues and rate the performance of each DHB’s Chief Executive. The results
are publish on their website102, and ASMS use their member’s perspectives as evidence
of DHB management performance in the media.103 In terms of industrial relations
tactics, this clever strategy has the advantage of maintaining a steady stream of “news”
for media releases, keeping the interests of ASMS members at the forefront of headlines,
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfmc id=1&objectid=10505469
94http://www.asms.org.nz/includes/download.aspxID=95842 Clause 4
95http://www.asms.org.nz/includes/download.aspxID=95842 Clause 5.1 (a)
96http://www.asms.org.nz/includes/download.aspxID=95842 Clause 5.1 (b) and 5.1 (c)
97http://www.asms.org.nz/Site/About Us/Default.aspx, second bullet point in second role description
98http://www.asms.org.nz/Site/Publications/AddressesP apers.aspx
99http://journal.nzma.org.nz/journal/121-1274/3068/content.pdf, http://journal.nzma.org.nz/journal/117-
1204/1115/content.pdf
100http://journal.nzma.org.nz/journal/121-1274/3068/content.pdf first paragraph
101http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/240866/claim-nz-hospitals-are-under-funded
102http://www.asms.org.nz/includes/download.aspxID=133183
103http://www.odt.co.nz/news/dunedin/297638/doctors-rate-sdhb-poorly
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whilst presenting their findings as impartial “evidence” which can use to legitimise
their engagement in health-sector policy processes without the threat of industrial
strike action being used.
• New Zealand Nurses Organisation (NZNO)
The NZNO is an incorporated society whose first objective is to “Lead the nursing
profession through advocating for professional excellence and collective industrial
aspirations”.104 Unlike the NZRDA or ASMS, the NZNO’s constitution has a strong
bi-cultural flavour, with direct reference to advancing Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the
improvement of Maori health as its society objectives. Both a President and Kaiwhaka-
haere jointly lead the NZNO, with equal powers to act as spokespersons for the NZNO,
and head the Organisation.
The overall flavour of the NZNOs Rules are much more focused on improving both the
Nursing profession and the environment nurses work within, as opposed to extracting
the maximum employment conditions for their members. Both the NZRDA and
ASMS’s Rules of Incorporation have promoting the collective employment interests of
their members as the first objective105, the NZNO instead focuses on the improving
the nursing profession’s excellence and its industrial (as opposed to employment)
aspirations. Even the second object of the NZNO Rules of Incorporation focus on
nursing “working” conditions, as opposed to “employment” conditions.
The scope of NZNO membership is extensive and includes: all nurses and midwives;
student training in nursing or midwifery; persons employed as nursing aids in either
the public or private sectors; occupational therapists, counsellors and social workers,
together with private sector employed administrative persons engaged in clerical work,
finances, accounts, etc. The described list is not exhaustive, with further employment
occupations in-scope for NZNO membership.106 The NZNO’s strategy for the nursing
profession107 identifies their membership base at approximately 46,000 members.
The NZNO do actively engage in industrial action, although unlike the NZRDA, the
target for strike action is limited to single organisations which are points of grievance.
104http://www.nzno.org.nz/Portals/0/Files/Documents/About/NZNO%20Constitution%202013-2014%20.pdf
105NZRDA: “Negotiate, protect, and improve the collective interests of its members”,
ASMS: “To protect and promote the interests of members in all aspects of their employment”
106http://www.nzno.org.nz/Portals/0/Files/Documents/About/NZNO%20Constitution%202013-2014%20.pdf
Schedule 1, Clause 1
107http://www.nzno.org.nz/Portals/0/publications/2020%20and%20Beyond%20-
%20A%20Vision%20for%20Nursing%20-%20executive%20summary,%202011.pdf
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There is not the same sense of mass strike action and all NZNO members striking in
collective solidarity as is reflected in NZRDA industrial action.108
Unlike both the NZRDA and ASMS, NZNO runs a transparent employer bargaining
strategy: its policy and goals are published on its website.109 The NZNO maintain
their bargaining strategy should be designed to improve the workplace environment
and ensure nurses and other health workers are valued fairly for the work that they
undertake; receive access to adequate professional support and training to sustain
quality clinical practice; and are supported in their working lives through a range of
other supports to enable them to enjoy healthy working lives. Their strategy aims
to strengthen the collective organisation and professional autonomy within both the
workplace and the wider health system.
• Association of Professional and Executive Employees (APEX)
APEX is an incorporated society whose first objective is to: “Negotiate, protect, and
improve the collective employment interests of its members.”110 Any person of “good
character” can become a member if they are employed in any employment areas covered
by APEX’s Divisions.111
APEX divisions cover: Medical Radiation Technologists (MRTs), Radiation Thera-
pists, Sonographers, Dental Therapists, Clinical Psychologists, Clinical Physiologists,
Managers, Medical Physicists, Hospital Scientists, Physiotherapists, Pharmacists,
Anaesthetic Technicians, Information Technology Workers, Dieticians, and Social
Workers.
APEX members have been known to collectively threaten to strike within divisions.
MRTs threatened a strike affecting nine DHBs in 2005.112 MRTs again threatened strike
action in 2010.113. West Coast DHBs Information Technology professions threatened
108Isolated targets have been DSS providers, the Oceania Group (http://www.oceanialiving.co.nz/), a provider of
Aged Care and (http://www.nzno.org.nz/about us/media releases/articletype/articleview/articleid/1148/oceania-
aged-care-workers-strike-to-go-ahead
http://www.nzno.org.nz/about us/media releases/articletype/articleview/articleid/1166/oceania-care-workers-
step-up-strike-action
and the Rosebank Home and Hospital in Ashburton (http://www.nzno.org.nz/about us/media releases/articletype/articleview/articleid/57/aged-
care-workers-at-rosebank-take-strike-action)
109http://www.nzno.org.nz/Portals/0/publications/NZNO%20Bargaining%20policy.pdf
110APEX Rules of Incorporation http://www.apex.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/APEX-rules-July-
2013.pdf Clause 4.1.1
111http://www.apex.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/APEX-rules-July-2013.pdf Clause 5.1
112http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/GE0505/S00095/dhbs-advisory-on-apex-strike-action.htm
113http://www.midcentraldhb.govt.nz/News/Pages/MidCentral-Health-Receives-Strike-Notice-on-7-
September-for-Medical-Radiation-Technologists.aspx
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strike action in 2011 in order to get DHBs to the negotiation table.114 MRTs threatened
strike action at Timaru hospital was called off at the last moment in 2010.115
APEX shares common National Executive ties with the NZRDA. Eleven of the twelve
members of the NZRDA’s National Executive are common to both the NZRDA and
APEX116 and the NZRDA117 (Figure (52)). Both organisations have common physical
locations, mailing addresses and phone numbers.
Figure 52: APEX and NZRDA National Executive
114http://www.apex.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/2011-11-18-Press-release-IT-Professionals-Strike-
Notice.pdf
115http://www.stuff.co.nz/timaru-herald/news/4322335/Radiographers-call-off-strike
116http://www.apex.org.nz/pageid = 198
117http://www.nzrda.org.nz/portfolio=495-2
160
